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ABSTRACT
SELF ATTRIBUTED BELIEF AND PRIVILEDGED ACCESS
MAY 1990
BETH A. DIXON, B.A., UNIVERISTY OF CALIFORNIA AT BERKELEY
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AT AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AT AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Linda Wetzel
Recent literature in the Philosophy of Language has
focused on a variety of puzzles about de se belief
—belief
about oneself formed by the use of the indexical 'I' or the
reflexive pronoun 'she herself'. These puzzle cases suggest
that de se belief cannot be represented in the traditional
way as a two-place relation between an individual and a
proposition. Nevertheless, there are some versions of this
traditional analysis that have not been fully discussed in
the literature.
In this dissertation I examine a number of proposals
for analyzing de se belief, and show how many of these
entail privileged access for the agents of self-attributed
belief. Privileged access for an agent takes the form of
either a proposition or a belief that only the agent can
entertain. Privileged access emerges as a consequence of
two-place relations of belief between believers and
propositions when the proposition is construed as a first-
person proposition, a first-person propositional guise, an
individual essence, or a Fregean 'I' thought. In all these
iv
cases I argue that privileged access for an agent leads to
counter-intuitive consequences about sentence meaning and
belief content. For this reason I investigate ways to
avoid privileged access altogether. I conclude that the
most viable alternatives are three-place relations of
belief
.
v
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CHAPTER 1
DE SE BELIEF
Introduction
At one stage of his intellectual odyssey, Bertrand
Russell believed that the speakers of sentences containing
'I' had privileged access to the propositions expressed by
those sentences. In a sense, these propositions were
inaccessible to all but the speakers of indexical sentences.
Russell's view resulted from his account of the meanings of
logically proper names, and an epistemological theory about
acguaintance . While most philosophers have since rejected
Russell's characterization of knowledge by acguaintance, the
main themes that guided Russell's thinking during this
period emerge in much of the contemporary philosophical
literature about de se belief (belief about oneself). 1 For
this reason I begin by explaining what privileged access
meant for Russell. In doing so I identify some of the
background assumptions that inspire contemporary versions
of privileged access.
Privileged Access—An Early View
In The Problems of Philosophy . 2 Russell describes a
particular case of knowledge by acguaintance. Consider his
description of the proposition that Bismarck is acquainted
with when he makes a statement about himself.
1
Suppose some statement made about
Bismarck. Assuming that there is such athing as direct acguaintance with
oneself
,
Bismarck himself might have
used his name directly to designate the
particular person with whom he was
acquainted. In this case, if he made ajudgement about himself, he himself
might be a constituent of the judgement.
Here the proper name has the direct use
which it always wishes to have, as
simply standing for a certain object,
and not for a description of the
object . 3
Later, Russell adds this about the Bismarck example:
It would seem that, when we make a
statement about something only known by
description, we often intend to make our
statement, not in the form involving the
description, but about the actual thing
described. That is to say, when we say
anything about Bismarck, we should like,
if we could, to make the judgement which
Bismarck alone can make, namely, the
judgement of which he himself is a
constituent. In this we are necessarily
defeated, since the actual Bismarck is
unkown to us. But we know that there is
an object B, called Bismarck, and that B
was an astute diplomatist. We can thus
describe the proposition we should like
to affirm, namely, 'B was an astute
diplomatist', where B is the object
which was Bismarck. If we are
describing Bismarck as 'the first
Chancellor of the German Empire', the
proposition we should like to affirm may
be described as 'the proposition
asserting, concerning the actual object
which was the first Chancellor of the
German Empire, that this object was an
astute diplomatist'. . . . This
proposition, which is described and is
known to be true, is what interests us;
but we are not acquainted with the
proposition itself, and do not know it .
though we know it is true . 4
What is notable about this example is the suggestion
that only Bismarck can be acquainted with the judgment about
2
himself containing Bismarck as a constituent. One
immediately wants to know—What proposition does Bismarck
assert about himself, and why is it only Bismarck can be
acquainted with this proposition? Russell's answers to
these questions are tied up with his account of the meanings
of logically proper names, and an epistemological theory
about acquaintance.
In Principia Mathematica 5 and Introduction to
Mathematical—Philosophy
,
8 Russell distinguishes between
siriiular terms that are logically proper names and singular
terms that are descriptions. About names, Russell says:
. . . a name, . . . is a simple symbol,
directly designating an individual which
is its meaning, and having this meaning
in its own right, independently of the
meanings of all other words . 7
Elsewhere Russell tells us that it is only names that occur
as genuine subjects in sentences of the subject-predicate
form. If a name is truly a logically proper name then "it
must name something ." 8 The meaning of each such name is
exhausted by the object for which the name stands.
Whenever the grammatical subject of a
proposition can be supposed not to exist
without rendering the proposition
meaningless, it is plain that the
grammatical subject is not a proper
name, i.e., not a name directly
representing some object . 9
Russell also thought that most of the singular terms
that we commonly regard as proper names are not logically
proper names. The expressions that Russell identified as
the genuine proper names were 'this', 'that', 'now' and ' I
*
3
expressions we would call 'indexicals' and
in contemporary terminology.
' demonstratives
'
If Bismarck uses a logically proper name like
•
I
• to
make a statement about himself, then the meaning of 'I' is
the denotation of this expression as Bismarck uses it. The
judgment Bismarck alone can make contains the denotation of
I on this occasion of use as a constituent of the
proposition Bismarck expresses by his statement. it is not
obvious what 'I' denotes, as Bismarck uses this expression,
since Russell says that the actual Bismarck is unknown to
us. We can merely describe the proposition that contains
the denotation of 'I' as Bismarck uses it, while Bismarck,
alone, is acquainted with this proposition. To see why this
is so, it is useful to know what Russell means by
'acquaintance'. He describes this relation by saying:
We shall say that we have
acquaintance with anything of which we
are directly aware, and without the
intermediary of any process of inference
or any knowledge of truths . 10
Russell tells us the things we are acquainted with are
sense-data, such as shape, color, hardness, etc., or
whatever we are immediately conscious of that makes up the
appearance of physical objects. In addition to sense-data
we are also acquainted with past events in virtue of having
immediate knowledge of these events by memory. And, we have
acquaintance with certain states of mind by introspection,
as when we become aware of our own perceptions.
4
Furthermore, in The Problems of Philosophy
,. Russell
suggests that we know the truth of sentences like 'I am
acquainted with this sense-datum' only because we are
acquainted with something we call 'I', or Self—though he
concedes it is only probable that we are acquainted with a
Self. 11 Bismarck's self—the subject of experience— is the
object of acquaintance that is a constituent of the
ProP°sition Bismarck expresses when he uses a sentence
containing 'I'. What and how Bismarck knows about his own
mental states are different from what and how we know about
Bismarck's mental states. Bismarck knows about himself by
introspection
,
while we are only aware of Bismarck in virtue
of being presented with sense-data from his body, or even
more indirectly, from reading about him. 12 Because the
object of acquaintance is a subjective Self, only Bismarck
can be acquainted with any proposition that contains this
Self as a constituent. Hence, any proposition expressed by
a sentence containing the name 'I' is a proposition to which
only the subject of 'I' has epistemic access. This is one
sense in which individuals may be said to have privileged
access to propositions. However, more contemporary versions
of privileged access can be found in the philosophical
literature
.
Some philosophers have rejected Russell's commitment to
selves, but still hold that there are propositions that only
one person can grasp— I call these 'first-person
propositions'. 13 In Chapters 1-5 I present arguments for
5
first-person propositions and discuss why these propositions
are objectionable. In Chapters 6 and 7 I consider ways to
avoid first-person propositions, and privileged access
altogether. Each of the proposals I discuss throughout the
dissertation offers some analysis of beliefs that are formed
by use of the indexical 'I', or the reflexive pronoun 'she
herself' or 'he himself'. Moreover, each analysis appears
to be motivated, in part, by a particular kind of example.
In the next section I present and discuss several versions
of this example.
The Irreplacabilitv Thesis
The distinctive character of de se belief was brought
to the attention of philosophers by a series of articles by
H.N. Castaneda, 14 though Castaneda himself credits P.
Geach 15 with articulating these examples for the first time.
In "'He': A Study in the Logic of Self-Consciousness,"
Castaneda is interested in drawing attention to the logical
status of a particular use of the pronoun 'he'. When 'he'
is used ". . . as a pointer to the object of someone's self-
knowledge, self-belief, or self-conjecture," 16 then 'he' is
short for 'he himself'. Castaneda identifies this
particular use of 'he' as 'he*'. Since Castaneda's work on
'he*' is the catalyst for much of the literature about de se
belief, I quote his example in its entirety.
Suppose that a man called Privatus
informs his friend Gaskon that
(1) The Editor of Soul knows that
he* is a millionaire.
6
. . . The tokenn of 'he*' in (1) is
not a proxy for 'the Editor of Soul 1 .
If it were statement (1) would be the
same statement as:
(2) The Editor of Soul knows that
the Editor of Soul is a
millionaire
.
But (2) is not the same statement as
(1). For (1) does not entail (2). The
Editor of Soul may know that he himself
is a millionaire while failing to know
that he himself is the Editor of Soul
.
because, say, he believes that the
Editor of Soul is poverty-stricken
Richard Penniless. Indeed, (2) also
fails to entail (1). To see this
suppose that on January 15, 1965, the
man just appointed to the Editorship of
Soul does not yet know of his
appointment, and that he has read a
probated will by which an eccentric
businessman bequeathed several millions
to the man who happens to be the Editor
of Soul on that day. Thus, Privatus'
use of 'he himself' or 'he*' just cannot
be a proxy for 'the Editor of Soul'. . .
. . . We have seen that when
Privatus asserts "The Editor of Soul
believes that he* is a millionaire",
Privatus' tokenw of 'he*' is not a proxy
for the description 'The Editor of
Soul'. More generally, Privatus' tokenw
of 'he*' is not replaceable by any other
description or name of the Editor of
Soul (or of any other person or things)
,
which does not include another tokenw of
' he* '
.
. . .
. . . when Privatus asserts "The Editor
of Soul believes that he* is a
millionaire", Privatus does not
attribute to the Editor the possession
of any way of referring to himself
aside from his ability to use the
pronoun 'I' or his ability to be
conscious of himself. The latter
ability is the only way of referring to
himself that Privatus must attribute to
the Editor for his statement to be true.
Hence, the statement "The Editor of Soul
believes that he* is a millionaire" does
not entail any statement of the form
"The Editor of Soul
millionaire", where
7
name or description not containing
tokensw of 'he*'.
. . . Thus, we conclude that the pronoun
•he*' is never replaceable by a name or
a description not containing tokens^ of
'he *'. 17
In The First Person18 Roderick Chisholm cites
Castaneda's work in discussing 'he himself', but offers a
variation of Castaneda's example.
The 'he, himself' locution may be
illustrated by an example that Ernst
Mach cites in the second edition of the
Analysis of Sensations . He writes: 'Not
long ago, after a trying railway journey
by night, and much fatigued, I got into
an omnibus, just as another gentleman
appeared at the other end. "What shabby
pedagogue is that, that has just
entered?" thought I. It was myself;
opposite me hung a large mirror. The
physiognomy of my class, accordingly,
was better known to me than my own. ' As
Mach entered the bus, then, he believed
with respect to Mach—and therefore with
respect to himself—that he was a shabby
pedagogue, but he did not believe
himself to be a shabby pedagogue. The
experience might have made him say:
'That man is a shabby pedagogue. But—
-
prior to his discovery of the mirror— it
would not have led him to say: 'I am a
shabby pedagogue '. 19
Chisholm goes on to comment that "Examples are readily
multiplied." And so they are in the philosophical
literature. John Perry writes about mad Heimson who
believes himself to be Hume, Lingrens lost in the stacks of
the Stanford library, and the messy shopper who follows a
trail of sugar up one aisle and down the next, unaware that
he himself is the messy shopper. David Lewis describes the
case of two Gods, each omniscient, but neither knowing
which
God he himself is. What all these cases have in common
is a
8
thesis about the failure of substitution of the reflexive
pronoun 'he himself', when this expression occurs embedded
behind a propositional attitude verb.
Consider the following two sentences;
(1) Beth Dixon believes that she herself
is in danger.
(2) Beth Dixon believes that T is in
danger (where *T' is to be replaced by
any singular term denoting Beth Dixon
that contains no occurrence of 'she
herself
'
)
.
Sentence (1) attributes a de se belief to Beth Dixon, while
(2) attributes to Beth Dixon either a de re or de dicto
belief.
Suppose, in the first case, that we read sentence (2)
as the attribution of a de dicto belief by replacing 'T' in
(2) with the description 'the philosopher married to Mark
Holden', which actually denotes me. Then it is possible for
(1) to be true and (2) to be false, if, for example, I
suffer from amnesia and fail to believe that I am the
philosopher married to Mark Holden. Furthermore, for any
replacement of 'T' in (2) by a description uniquely
referring to Beth Dixon, it will always be possible for (1)
and (2) to differ in truth-value; though we may need to vary
the stories that make these cases plausible. Hence, (1) and
(2) do not mean the same thing and fail to attribute to me
the same belief. These facts have been taken to show that
(1), and other de se attributions of belief, are not
reducible to the logical form of sentences that purport to
make de dicto attributions of belief, as in (2) .
9
Sentence (2) may also be read in such a way that it
attributes to me a de re belief of Beth Dixon, that she is
in danger. This reading may be represented as:
(3) T is such that Beth Dixon believes
of T that she is in danger.
When (2) is construed as the de re belief in (3)
,
there are
reasons for thinking that (3) does not adeguately capture
the meaning of (1) . Suppose I am observing my own
reflection in a mirror, but fail to recognize myself. I
observe a maniac with a hatchet creeping up slowly behind
the woman I am watching. At this time I may form a belief
of the woman I see, that she is in danger. Hence, (3) is
true. But I fail to believe that I am in danger, so (1) is
false. The difference in truth-values of sentences (1) and
(3) shows that my belief in (1) cannot be represented by
(3)
.
Hence, when 'T' in (3) is replaced by some non-
indexical singular term denoting me, then it is possible
that (1) entails (3), but (3) does not entail (l). 20
Together these examples are designed to show that the
representation in (1) cannot be reduced to the logical form
of sentences that make attributions of either de dicto or de
re belief. The explanation for this is that 'she herself'
in (1) cannot be replaced by some co-referential name,
description, or demonstrative pronoun that does not contain
an occurrence of 'she herself', while preserving the truth-
value of (1) . Many of the philosophers I discuss throughout
the dissertation rely on the claim that 'she herself' is not
replacable in these contexts. In later chapters I refer to
10
the failure of substitution of 'she herself' in belief
contexts as the
' Irreplacability Thesis', or (IT).
Because it has been thought that (IT) is true only for
oblique contexts created by propositional attitude verbs
like 'believes', 'knows', 'fears', etc., each of the views
discussed in Chapters Two-Seven assumes some particular
analysis of propositional attitude sentence constructions.
I take 'believes' to be paradigmatic of this sentence type,
so I restrict my attention to how sentences of the form a
believes that S are to be analyzed, where 'a' is replaced
by some singular term denoting an individual, and 'S' is
replaced by any sentence.
In Chapters Two-Five I examine the view that belief is
a two-place relation between a believer and the proposition
expressed by a sentence. The philosophers who advance such
an analysis include Norman Kretzman, Patrick Grim, H.N.
Castaneda, R. Chisholm ( Person and Object s
,
and Gareth
Evans. Each offers an analysis of belief where the
proposition believed is a first-person proposition. Such
propositions are expressed by indexical sentences containing
'I', and can be believed, known, etc., only by the speakers
of those sentences. Because there are difficulties
associated with construing first-person propositions as
sentence meanings and objects of thought, I go on to seek an
alternative to the accounts of self-attribution discussed in
Chapters Two-Five.
11
John Perry's proposal that belief is analyzed as a
three—place relation between a believer, a proposition
expressed by a sentence, and a "belief state" offers some
initial optimism for avoiding first-person propositions.
But Perry's view suffers from a difficulty about how to
individuate belief states.
In Chapter Seven I consider another way to avoid
privileged access by examining the view that belief is a
two-place relation between a believer and a property. I
discuss the details of Roderick Chisholm's theory in The
First Person , as well as a similar account presented by
David Lewis. While privileged access is not a problem for
property theories, there are other reasons for rejecting
these specific proposals.
My project here is to explain how and why privileged
access emerges from some analyses of first-person indexical
belief. I argue that inaccessible propositions and beliefs
raise more problems than they solve. For this reason, the
analyses of belief that lead to inaccessibility should be
avoided, if possible. In the conclusion I speculate about
the prognosis for formulating an adequate account of de se
belief that does not entail privileged access.
12
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CHAPTER 2
FIRST-PERSON PROPOSITIONS
Introduction
In this chapter I identify what I take to be the Basic
Argument for the introduction of first-person propositions.
There are two versions of this argument—one offered by
Norman Kretzmann in his article "Omniscience and
Immutability," 1 and the other by Patrick Grim from "Against
Omniscience: The Case from Essential Indexicals .
"
2 An
examination of these two versions of the Basic Argument
allows us to formulate a definition of a first-person
proposition, and to see what consequences follow from
accepting their existence. In the conclusion of this
chapter I argue that first-person propositions force us to
diverge from the traditional conception of a proposition
when these are construed as sentence meanings and as the
objects of thought. For this reason, I recommend a search
for more compelling arguments for introducing first-person
propositions into our ontology.
The Basic Argument
In the concluding section of "Omniscience and
Immutability" Norman Kretzmann makes use of certain facts
about indexicality to argue that omniscience is incompatible
with theism. The argument Kretzmann offers here is of
interest because it seems to rely on the thesis that there
15
are propositions that only one person can grasp. Here is
the relevant passage by Kretzmann:
Consider these two statements.
(51) Jones knows that he
[himself] is in the hospital.
(52 ) Jones knows that Jones is
in the hospital.
SI and S2 are logically independent. It
may be that Jones is an amnesia case.
He knows perfectly well that he is in a
hospital, and after reading the morning
papers he knows that Jones is in the
hospital. An omniscient being surely
must know all that Jones knows. Anyone
can know what S2 describes Jones as
knowing, but no one other than Jones can
know what SI describes Jones as knowing.
(A case in point: Anyone could have
proved that Descartes existed, but that
is not what Descartes proved in the
Cogito, and what he proved in the Cogito
could not have been proved by anyone
else.) The kind of knowledge SI
ascribes to Jones is, moreover, the kind
of knowledge characteristic of every
self-conscious entity, of every person.
Every person knows certain propositions
that no other person can know.
Therefore, if God is omniscient, theism
is false, and if theism is true, God is
not omniscient. 3
Kretzmann is arguing here that theism in incompatible
with an omniscient God. The theological conclusion may
interest us because it appears to depend on Kretzmann'
s
claim that "Every person knows certain propositions that no
other person can know." This remark suggests that Kretzmann
is arguing for some version of privileged access, but if so,
the reasoning is unclear. In what follows I construct an
argument, consistent with other remarks Kretmann makes here,
in order to clarify why Kretzmann may have been led to claim
16
that "Every person knows certain propositions that no other
person can know."
Kretzmann begins this passage by stating that (SI) and
(S2 ) are logically independent. The example he cites is
evidence for this claim if we reason in the following way.
If Jones has amnesia, then it is possible that he fails to
know he himself is Jones. Therefore, it is possible for
Jones to know that he himself is in the hospital while
failing to know that Jones is in the hospital. So, it is
possible for (SI) to be true while (S2) is false.
Alternatively, Jones may read in the morning paper that a
person named 'Jones' is in the hospital. From this he may
know that Jones is in the hospital, but since he does not
know that he himself is Jones, he fails to realize he
himself is in the hospital. (In this case we suppose that
Jones does not recognize the hospital surroundings.) This
latter case is one where (S2) is true while (SI) is false.
Kretzmann goes on to claim that "Anyone can know what
( S2 ) describes Jones as knowing, but no one other than Jones
can know what (SI) describes Jones as knowing." This
premise does not follow just from the fact that (SI) and
(S2 ) are logically independent. Kretzmann suggests that the
kind of knowledge ascribed to Jones in (SI) is
characteristic of every self-conscious entity, and he cites
what Descartes proved by the Cogito as a case of this kind
of knowledge. Maybe Kretzmann 's reference to Descartes can
be explained in the following way. Descartes knew that 'I
17
exist' was true when uttered or conceived by Descartes
himself. Analogously, what Jones knows in (SI) can be
specified by Jones, himself, uttering or conceiving 'I am in
the hospital '
.
The analogy to Descartes has obvious limitations.
Surely Kretzmann does not want to maintain that Jones can
prove what Jones would express by ' I am in the hospital' in
the same way that Descartes proved what he expressed by 'I
exist' as this occurs in the Coqito passage of The
Meditations . Descartes could not have used an utterance of
'I am in the hospital' as the first principle about which he
could be absolutely certain. Perhaps Kretzmann is
interested in showing that the cases are alike insofar as
both Descartes and Jones can report on what they know by
using the indexical 'I'. In a footnote Kretzmann credits
Castaneda for observations he makes in the article "'He': A
Study in the Logic of Self-Consciousness . Here, Castaneda
says
:
. . . when Privatus asserts 'the Editor
of Soul believes that he* is a
millionaire', Privatus does not
attribute to the Editor the possession
of any way of referring to himself
aside from his ability to use the
pronoun 'I' or his ability to be
conscious of himself . 5
By citing this passage, Kretzmann may be offering some
justification for redescribing what Jones knows in (SI) as
the proposition expressed by Jones's utterance of ' I am in
the hospital'. But even if we redescribe what Jones knows
in (SI) as the proposition expressed by Jones's utterance of
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•I am in the hospital
', it is still not clear why Kretzmann
claims no one but Jones can know this proposition.
One way of understanding Kretzmann 's comment is to
suppose that he is making implicit use of the
Irreplacability Thesis discussed in Chapter One. This
thesis says that when 'he himself' is embedded behind a
propositional attitude verb, co-referential substitutions
for this expression may fail. Specifically,
For some name or description 'T' that
refers to Jones (not containing an
occurrence of 'he himself'), it is
possible that (1) and (2) differ in
truth-value.
(1) Jones knows that he himself is in
the hospital.
(2) Jones knows that T is in the
hospital
.
Following Castaneda, we might infer from the failure of
substitution of 'he himself' in (SI), that (SI) does not
attribute to Jones some way of referring to himself aside
from his ability to use the pronoun 'I'.
Kretzmann speaks about propositions being the "objects
of knowledge," 6 so there is evidence to indicate he would
accept the claim that:
Belief and knowledge, and other
propositional attitudes, are two-place
relations between an individual and a
proposition
.
For example, if Max believes that ketchup is a vegetable,
then Max is related to the proposition expressed by 'ketchup
is a vegetable'.
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If it is possible for Jones to know the proposition
expressed by his utterance of ' I am in the hospital' but
know the proposition expressed by ^ T is in the
hospital^, where 'T' is some non-indexical name or
description referring to Jones, then the proposition
expressed by ' I am in the hospital' as uttered by Jones is
not identical to the proposition expressed by T is in the
1hospital in (2)
.
This still does not allow us to infer that only Jones
can know the proposition expressed by Jones's utterance of
'I am in the hospital
' ,
unless we suppose that the
Irreplacability Thesis can be extended to sentences uttered
by individuals other than Jones.
(IT) implies that the expression 'I' in Jones's
utterance of ' I am in the hospital ' cannot be replaced by
some name, description, or demonstrative pronoun referring
to Jones, because no other singular term will guarantee that
Jones knowingly identifies himself. Jones may not know that
he is referring to himself when he uses the name 'Jones', or
if he uses 'you' when pointing to a mirror reflection of
himself. The same kind of mistake that Jones makes when
using the name 'Jones' or 'you' may also arise when
individuals other than Jones use these expressions to refer
to Jones. Mary may utter 'You are in the hospital' and fail
to know that she has referred to Jones. Perhaps the person
she points to is wrapped in bandages and she mistakes Jones
for someone else. Since it is possible that Jones, as well
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as Mary, may be wrong about the identity of the person
refered to by 'you', we might infer that the proposition
Jones knows when he utters 'I am in the hospital', is not
identical to the proposition Mary knows when she utters 'You
are in the hospital', while actually pointing to Jones.
More generally, the proposition expressed by Jones's
utterance of ' I am in the hospital' is not identical to the
proposition expressed by r T is in the hospital 1 in (3)
,
where 'T' is replaced by some name, description, or
demonstrative pronoun referring to Jones, not containing a
first-person indexical.
(3) Mary knows that T is in the hospital.
So, the proposition Jones knows in (SI) can be expressed in
oratio recta only by the indexical sentence 'I am in the
hospital' as said by Jones.
Furthermore, only Jones can use the indexical sentence
'I am in the hospital' to express the very proposition that
Jones knows in (SI) since, only Jones can use the indexical
'I' to make reference to himself. This grammatical
restraint on the indexical reference of 'I', together with
the claim that no other proposition is identical to what
Jones knows in (SI)
,
suggests that "only Jones can know what
(SI) describes Jones as knowing." For this to be so, we
must make the additional assumption that a person knows a
proposition only if they can use a sentence that expresses
that proposition. For example, since Mary cannot use 'I' to
assert that Jones is in the hospital, she cannot know the
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proposition expressed by Jones's utterance of ' I am in the
hospital '
.
According to this way of reasoning, the proposition
Jones knows in (SI) is a first-person proposition. The
argument for first-person propositions sketched here I will
refer to as the 'Basic Argument'. It goes quite beyond what
Kretzmann explicitly commits himself to in the passage
quoted earlier. Nevertheless, appealing to this reasoning,
I maintain, is the best explanation for why Kretzmann claims
that "Every person knows certain propositions that no other
person can know."
Regardless of whether Kretzmann is so committed, the
following characterization of first-person propositions
begins to emerge:
(a) First-person propositions are those
propositions that are expressed by the
use of indexical sentences containing
'I', or any first-person pronoun.
Furthermore, no one but Jones can have as an object of
knowledge the proposition expressed by ' I am in the
hospital' as uttered by Jones. Another way of stating this
is to say:
(b) First-person propositions are
private to the speakers of indexical
sentences containing 'I', or any first-
person pronoun.
The intelligibility of (b) depends partly on clarifying
the sense of 'private' as it occurs here. Specifically, we
can define a First-Person Proposition (FP) relative to an
individual and a context as follows:
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(FP) is a first-person proposition
relative to an individual S and a
context c, where S is the agent in c, if
and only if
( ^
P) [P is an indexical
sentence containing 'I', or any first-
person pronoun, such that:
(i) 'I' refers to S in c; and
(ii) P expresses relative to c; and
(iii) <> (S believes jrfj ; and
(iv) D (V S*) (S* / S -> S* does not
believe JZf) ] . 7
The class of first-person propositions includes more than
those propositions that are the objects of belief. We can
replace 'believes' in clause (iii) and (iv) of (FP) with a
variable that ranges over any psychological verb to get the
more general principle that 0 cannot be an object of a
psychological attitude for anyone but S. 8 If there are
first-person propositions, then for any person who utters a
first-person indexical sentence, and believes what they say,
there is a first-person proposition expressed by that
sentence that is the object of belief only for the
individual referred to by 'I'. According to (FP)
,
of
necessity, no one but the referent of 'I' can believe these
first-person propositions. In this sense, first-person
propositions are 'inaccessible' to all but the agents of
first-person indexical sentences.
The success of the Basic Argument depends on two
important assumptions. First, the assumption that the
Irreplacability Thesis is true, and that we can use this
thesis to infer that a first-person proposition is not
identical to a proposition expressed by a sentence not
containing a first-person indexical—regardless of who
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utters such a sentence. Second, the assumption that belief
and knowledge, and other propositional attitudes, can be
analyzed as two-place relations between an individual and a
proposition. However, even if one accepts these
assumptions, there is still reason for doubting the
conclusion that first-person propositions exist. Castaneda,
for one, accepts the Irreplacability Thesis, as well as the
claim that belief is a two-place relation, but rejects
Kretzmann's conclusion that only one person can know the
proposition expressed by a first-person indexical sentence.
I discuss Castaneda's reply to Kretzmann in Chapter Three.
Another Version of the Basic Argument
In an article by Patrick Grim, "Against Omniscience:
The Case from Essential Indexicals ,
"
9 we find another
argument for first-person propositions that resembles the
Basic Argument. In fact, by Grim's own description, he is
advancing a slightly different version of Kretzmann's
argument against the possibility of an omniscient God. Like
Kretzmann, Grim also relies on showing that first-person
propositions exist to establish the more general theological
conclusion. It is this first step in Grim's reasoning that
interests us primarily. Grim considers this example from
Perry's article, "The Problem of the Essential
Indexical .
"
10
I follow a trail of spilled sugar around
and around a tall aisle in the
supermarket, in search of the shopper
who is making a mess. Suddenly I
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realize that the trail of sugar that I
have been following is spilling from a
torn sack in my cart, and that I am the
culprit— I am making a mess. 11
Grim argues in the following way. What I believe or
know in (4) is not the same, and cannot be fully explained
by what I believe or know in (5)
:
(4) I am making a mess.
(5) Patrick Grim is making a mess.
Grim says:
In order to give a realization on my
part that Patrick Grim is making a mess
the full explanatory force of my
realization that I am making a mess, in
fact, we would have to add that I know
that I am Patrick Grim. And that, of
course, is to reintroduce the
indexical
.
12
Grim might also have appealed to the Irreplacability
Thesis to argue that Grim's utterance of (4) expresses a
different proposition than the proposition expressed by (5)
.
That is, if it is possible for Grim to believe or know the
proposition expressed by his utterance of (4)
,
but fail to
believe the proposition expressed by (5)
,
then (4) and (5)
do not express the same proposition.
What is known or expressed in terms of
[4], then—that I am making a mess— is
not merely what is known or expressed
without the indexical in terms of [5]. 13
In order to establish that what Grim believes or knows
in (4) cannot be believed or known by anyone else, we need
to consider the case where some individual other than Grim
believes or knows what is expressed by (5)
.
Grim says:
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A being distinct from me could, of
course, know [5]. . . But as argued
above, this does not amount to what I
know in knowing [4]. 14
Grim appears to assume here that beings can believe or know
only the propositions that they can, themselves, express by
sentences
. Since a being distinct from Grim cannot use the
indexical sentence in (4) to assert a proposition about Grim
making a mess, she cannot know that proposition.
Moreover, a being distinct from Grim might believe or
know:
(6) He is making a mess.
But what is believed or known in (6) is not what Grim
believes or knows in (4)
.
Following Perry, Grim argues for
this claim by introducing a mirror example of the sort we
have discussed in Chapter One.
For consider a case in which I see
myself and my messy trail of sugar in a
fish-eye mirror at the end of the aisle.
I might then come to believe [6] de re
of the man in the mirror—of myself, as
it happens
—
just as anyone else might
come to believe [6] de re of me. But I
would not thereby know what I know in
knowing [4], for I still might not
realize that it is me in the mirror. A
knowledge de re of me and my mess, then,
still falls short of what I know in
knowing [4] de se. 15
Grim is arguing here that if anyone were to formulate the de
re belief about Grim by using sentence (6), they would not
express the same proposition as the proposition expressed by
Grim's utterance of (4). As Grim puts it, 'I' in (4) is
"essential" to what Grim believes or knows. This is to say
that ' I ' in (4) cannot be eliminated from (4) without
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changing the truth value of (4)
.
No sentence not containing
I or 'he himself' expresses the same proposition that Grim
believes or knows in (4). The rest of the argument for the
theological conclusion proceeds as follows.
But what I know in such a case, it
appears, is known by no omniscient
being. The indexical 'I', as argued
above, is essential to what I know in
knowing [4]. But only I can use that
'I' to index me—no being distinct from
me can do so. I am not omniscient. But
there is something that I know that no
being distinct from me can know.
Neither I nor any being distinct from
me, then, is omniscient: there is no
omniscient being. 16
There are several obvious difficulties with this
argument. First, Grim seems to require that God's capacity
for knowing depends on linguistic assertion. The fact that
an omniscient being cannot use a sentence to express the
proposition expressed by (4) does not necessarily mean he
cannot know this proposition, unless we also assume that in
order to know a proposition an omniscient being must be able
to assert a sentence that expresses it. I see no reason for
making this latter assumption. It is no more plausible to
suppose that a less than omniscient being other than Grim
can know the proposition Grim knows, expressed by Grim's
utterance of (4), since this conclusion also depends on the
claim that in order to know a proposition a person must be
able to assert a sentence that expresses that proposition.
Still, even if we grant Grim this assumption, Grim's
argument for propositions that only one person can know,
does not square with a whole range of cases involving third
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person attributions of knowledge. Consider a sentence like
the following:
(7) Mary knows that I am making a mess.
According to Grim, the embedded clause in (7) ' I am making a
mess', expresses a proposition that can be known only by the
referent of 'I'— in this case, Beth Dixon. But (7)
attributes to Mary knowledge of this first-person
proposition. If sentences like (7) are not counter-examples
to the view that only one person can know a first-person
proposition, then there must be some alternative account
explaining these third person attributions of knowledge. No
such explanation is provided by Grim in his discussion of
indexical sentences.
However, we can speculate about what Grim should say
regarding (7) and sentences of this form. The embedded
occurrence of 'I' in (7) can be replaced salva veritate by
some name or description referring to Beth Dixon. In a
sentence like (7) the subordinate clause does not express
the "thought content" attributed to Mary. Since Mary cannot
refer to Dixon using 'I', she must have some other way of
making reference to Dixon that is not revealed by sentence
(7). To represent what Mary knows in (7) we can replace 'I'
with Mary's way of referring to Beth Dixon.
Since Grim does not extend his analysis of indexical
sentences to explain third person attributions of knowledge
and belief, it is difficult to assess his view that
believing a sentence containing a first-person indexical
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reference involves believing a first-person proposition.
The view that sentences containing 'I' express such
propositions appears false when faced with sentence (7) and
others of this same form.
Problems for First-Person Propositions
Even if we accept the reasoning that constitutes the
Basic Argument for the existence of first-person
propositions, we may still be reluctant to admit such
entities into our ontology. In this section I argue that
accepting the existence of first-person propositions forces
us to diverge from the traditional conception of what a
proposition is. To this end, it is useful to see how some
philosophers have characterized propositions in general.
Propositions have been traditionally regarded as the
bearers of truth-values, or the entities that are timelessly
true or false. 17 Moreover, it is often claimed that a
proposition is true or false in virtue of the way the world
is. Consider the following sentences:
(8) Beth Dixon is tired at 4:36 on July
17, 1987.
(9) I am tired at 4:36 on July 17, 1987
(uttered by Beth Dixon)
.
The proposition expressed by sentence (8) is true if it is
the case that Beth Dixon is tired at the time specified, and
false otherwise. Likewise, sentence (9) is true if it is
the case that Beth Dixon is tired at the time specified,
since Beth Dixon is the person referred to by in (9).
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Exactly the same conditions make both (8) and (9) true.
Both sentences express a proposition about the same person,
and attribute the same property to that person. For this
reason, we are naturally led to suppose that the
propositions expressed by (8) and (9) are the same.
This way of individuating propositions is not
consistent with our supposing that a first-person
proposition is expressed by sentence (9). Suppose belief is
a two-place relation between an individual and a
Proposition, and I, Beth Dixon, believe the proposition
expressed by sentence (9). Call this proposition a
first-person proposition relative to Beth Dixon. Now
consider the case where (8) is uttered by another person, S.
Call the proposition expressed by (9), ' ^ . If S believes
what she says, then S believes
. But it is not possible
for S to believe $
,
according to condition (iv) of (FP) .
This means that p and Y are not identical, even though the
very same conditions that make (jl true, also make Y true.
This result is contrary to the intuitive explanation of what
makes these propositions true or false.
Another standard way of characterizing propositions is
to identify these with the meanings of sentences. G.E.
Moore, for example, says that a proposition is expressed by
a collection of words. 18 This suggests that propositions
are the contents of what is said when a person utters a
sentence, or that a proposition is the statement expressed
by a particular occurrence of a sentence. Alonzo Church, in
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his article "Propositions and Sentences, "19 characterizes
propositions in the following way:
A proposition is an abstract entity
expressed by a declarative sentence, andis
. . . the content of meaning which is
common to the sentence and its
translation into other languages. 20
According to this conception, a proposition is the meaning
of the words expressed by a declarative sentence.
Ordinarily, we believe that if a sentence is uttered on
two different occasions by the same person, or by two
<^ lllerGnl: people, the sentence uttered has the same meaning
on both occasions. For example, if sentence (8) is uttered
by Beth Dixon, and at some later time by another person S, S
and I utter sentences that mean the same thing. If
propositions are identified with the meanings of sentences,
then S and I express the same proposition by our respective
utterances of (8)
.
Indexical sentences pose a difficulty for this
particular criterion of synonymy. If sentence (9) is
uttered by Beth Dixon and also by S, there is reason to
suppose that these respective utterances do not have the
same meaning, since what I say is true, while what S says
may be false. 21
First-person propositions are consistent with this way
of individuating the meanings of indexical sentences. If
there are first-person propositions, then S and I express
different first-person propositions by our respective
utterances of 'I am tired at 4:36 on July 17, 1987'. The
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proposition expressed by my utterance of this sentence can
be known only by me, and the proposition expressed by S '
s
utterance of this sentence can be known only by S. Because
it is possible for me to know my first-person proposition,
but not S's, these propositions must be different. if we
identify propositions with the meanings of sentences, this
result is consistent with the claim that the meaning of an
indexical sentence changes relative to the context of
utterance
.
However, there is still a sense of 'same meaning'
whereby S and I do utter sentences with the same meaning
when we both utter the indexical sentence 'I am tired at
4:36 on July 17, 1987'. We do utter the same syntactic
string, and the same linguistic rules apply to both
utterances. If the meaning of a sentence is identified with
the linguistic conventions or public rules for using and
understanding language, then S and I utter sentences that
have the same meaning--we make the same assertion, though
this assertion is about different people. It is this sense
of 'meaning' that might be invoked to explain how
communication between language users takes place. There is
a plausible assumption about how understanding and
communication occur between users of a language: In order
for communication to be successful between speakers and
hearers, the hearer must grasp the meaning of the sentence
that the speaker utters.
32
If first-person propositions are the meanings of
indexical sentences in the sense just described, it is
difficult to see how this theory of communication could be
true . Since only I can be related to, or entertain, the
first-person proposition that is the meaning of the
indexical sentence I utter, this may imply that other
speakers do not understand what I mean when I utter an
indexical sentence.
One solution to this difficulty may be to reject the
particular theory of communication just mentioned. It is
still the case, however, that if first-person propositions
exist, S cannot assert a sentence that expresses the same
proposition as the indexical sentence I utter. This is a
significant departure from the conception of linguistic
meaning described above. A traditional account of sentence
meanings has it that these meanings exist in a public
domain—every linguistic meaning accessible to every
individual capable of using and understanding the language.
If we admit first-person propositions into our ontology and
accept some version of the claim that propositions are the
meanings of sentences, then we must relinquish the idea
that sentence meanings are public. This result seems
contrary to our intuitions about the nature of linguistic
meaning and the relation between meaning and communication.
The standard conception of a proposition also includes
characterizing these entities as objects of thought. The
psychological account of propositions has it that they are
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what is believed, known, feared, or entertained by
individuals. This being so, we need to say something
further about how well first-person propositions
characterize the psychological states of individuals.
To say that propositions are the objects of thought
does not decide the issue of whether they are subjective or
objective entities. If Mary utters 'I am hungry' and
believes what she says, then what Mary believes is the
proposition expressed by her utterance of ' I am hungry'.
What Mary believes may be either a subjective entity
—
part
of the content of Mary's consciousness, or an objective
entity that exists independently of Mary's mind, but is in
some way related to Mary's mind
—
perhaps Mary "grasps" this
proposition by thinking about it.
Gottlob Frege argues that propositions or thoughts must
be objective, rather than subjective entities. In "The
Thought " 22 Frege takes pains to distinguish propositions
from ideas, which he associates with the "inner world of
sense-impressions, . . . feelings and moods ... a world of
inclinations . . ," 23 Since condition (iv) of (FP) requires
that first-person propositions be private to the agent
referred to by 'I', this suggests that first-person
propositions, if they exist, may be more like Frege's ' inner
world" of ideas, than objective entities. Since
propositions have been traditionally understood to exist
objectively and independently of minds, rather than as the
contents of a particular consciousness, there is already a
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suspicion that first-person propositions give us the wrong
characterization of thought content. For the present time I
withhold judgment about how well first-person propositions
characterize the psychological states of individuals until
specific proposals can be discussed in later chapters.
Because first-person propositions force us to diverge
somewhat from the traditional conception of a proposition,
and interfere with the role we expect propositions to play
as sentence meanings and objects of thought, we may be
reluctant to admit these propositions into our ontology.
For this reason I devote the next three chapters to
examining alternative accounts of self-attribution that
preserve the principle that 'believes' and other
propositional attitude verbs are two-place relations
between an individual and a proposition.
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CHAPTER 3
FIRST-PERSON PROPOSITIONAL GUISES
Introduction
In this chapter I examine Castaneda's challenge to
Kretzmann's version of the Basic Argument. Castaneda
attempts to show that more than one person can know the
proposition expressed by an indexical sentence. I explain
how he is forced to revise his reply to Kretzmann and
commits himself to the existence of first-person
propositional guises that only the speakers of first-person
indexical sentences can entertain. I show here that the
introduction of propositional guises as the objects of
belief and knowledge is no advantage over first-person
propositions. Castaneda individuates first-person
propositional guises too narrowly for these to play a
satisfactory role in attributions of belief and explanations
of behavior.
Castaneda's Reply
Replying to Kretzmann, Castaneda argues that an
omniscient God and any finite being can believe, know, or
consider a proposition that makes a first-person indexical
reference
.
1
Consider again Kretzmann's example about Jones.
(51) Jones knows that he (himself) is in
the hospital.
( 52 ) Jones knows that Jones is in the
hospital
.
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Castaneda is committed to defending at least part of
Kretzmann's reasoning about (SI) and (S2). He has
persuasively argued in various publications that the
indicator, 'I', is never replacable by a name or description
not containing tokens of ' 1'.^ Hence, Castaneda appears to
accept the truth of the Irreplacability Thesis.-* But
according to Castaneda, the occurrence of the indexical 'I'
can be eliminated by another person in favor of a "quasi-
indicator". About quasi-indicators, Castaneda says:
I call quasi- indicators the expressions
which in oratio obliqua represent uses,
perhaps only implicit, of indicators
[the personal and demonstrative pronouns
and adverbs like 'this', 'that', 'I',
•you', 'here', 'there', and 'now'] i.e.,
uses which are ascribed to some person
or persons by means of a cognitive or
linguistic verb. 4
For example, if Jones knows what he would express by 'I
am in the hospital', we can describe what Jones knows by
making use of the quasi-indicator 'he himself', as in
sentence (SI) . But this quasi-indicator is the only
linguistic expression that preserves the full force of
Jones's utterance. 5 Nevertheless, from this Castaneda
insists it does not follow (as Kretzmann supposes) that no
one but Jones can know the proposition attributed to Jones
in (SI) . To show this, Castaneda relies on the following
principle
:
(P) If a sentence of the form 'X knows
that a person Y knows that . . .
'
formulates a true statement, then the
person X knows the statement formulated
by the clause filling the blank '...'. 6
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Castaneda here uses 'statement' and 'proposition'
interchangeably. 7 So (P) is a principle about the
transitivity of knowledge of propositions. This principle
deserves careful scrutiny, since it functions as the front-
line of defense against Kretzmann's argument. Already one's
suspicions are aroused by Castaneda's qualifying remarks
concerning (P)
.
Castaneda warns that (P) does not license
detachment of expressions such as 'X knows that ...'. 8 in
particular, he wants to guard against using (P) to make
invalid inferences when the embedded clause represented by
'
. . .
' in (P) contains a quasi-indicator. For example,
consider the following sentence:
(1) Mary knows that George knows that he
himself is in pain.
Principle (P) does not entitle us to infer that:
(2) Mary knows that he himself is in
pain.
The reason, Castaneda says, is that "there is no such
proposition.
"
9
What Castaneda probably means when he says that (2)
does not express a proposition is this: The reference of
'he himself' in (1) depends on the reference of the
antecedent name 'George'. In this sense quasi-indicators
are referentially and syntactically dependent on their
antecedents. 10 But when 'he himself is in pain' is detached
from the entire clause 'George knows that he himself is in
pain', as it is in (2), then 'he himself' in (2) cannot
successfully refer to George. Hence, (2) cannot express a
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proposition about George's being in pain. And, since 'he
himself' in (2) is not syntactically the right indicator to
refer to Mary, (2) cannot express a proposition about Mary
being in pain. 11
However, as Castaneda explains, (P) and (1) together do
imply that Mary and George know the very same proposition
about George's being in pain. 1 ^ This suggests that
Castaneda leaves us with no way of expressing in oratio
recta what Mary knows, provided (P) is true. It will not do
to say Mary knows of George that he is in pain, since by the
Basic Argument, George may fail to know that George, or he
(while demonstrating a mirror image of himself) is in pain.
The closest approximation we can make is to specify what
George knows in oratio recta . What George knows in the
attribution of (3) can be expressed by George's statement in
(4) :
(3) George knows that he himself is in
pain.
(4) I am in pain.
In correspondence with Robert Adams, 13 Castaneda
describes the relation between sentences of the form of (3)
and (4) by making explicit a principle he claims to have
assumed throughout his earlier writing and discussions of
the 'he himself' locution.
(Q) A quasi-indexical clause of degree
one expresses in its oratio recta
context the identical proposition that a
corresponding indexical sentence paired
with a certain context of utterance
expresses
.
14
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Principle (Q) is apparently operating implicitly in
Castaneda's reply to Kretzmann. Castaneda says:
The statement that Jones knows by [SI]
is one that Jones would express by
saying 'I am in the hospital '. 15
Furthermore, if a person other than Jones, call him
'a', knows that Jones knows that he himself is in the
hospital, then by principle (P)
,
a knows the proposition
expressed by 'he himself is in the hospital' in (SI). Since
by (Q) / the proposition expressed by 'he himself is in the
hospital' in (SI) is the very same proposition that is
expressed by Jones's assertion of ' I am in the hospital', it
is possible for a to know the proposition expressed by
Jones's first-person indexical reference.
Kretzmann 's argument that omniscience is incompatible
with theism depends on the claim that the propositions
expressed by sentences containing a first-person indexical
reference can be known by only one person. Hence,
Castaneda's concluding remark:
. . . omniscience is not, by the
route, incompatible with theism . 1
If Castaneda is correct, then there are no first-person
propositions
—
propositions expressed by first-person
indexical sentences that can be known by only one person.
But Castaneda himself concedes his reasoning is not
conclusive by renouncing the principle we have stated as
(Q)
.
Castaneda says:
Consider Tiresia's 'I am the blind
Tiresias' . I used to hold that it is
identical to the statement anybody can
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formulate with the clause 'he himself is
the blind Tiresias' as part of the
statement 'Tiresias believes that he
himself is the blind Tiresias'. Perry
chides me for this error. He remarks,
correctly, that jettisoning that
erroneous claim weakens my argument
against Norman Kretzmann about
omniscience. (But the weakening is not
fatal.
)
17
Castaneda explains that the reassessment of his own position
was brought about by several counter-examples introduced by
Rogers Albritton and Robert Adams. In the next section, I
examine the counter-example that apparently led Castaneda to
reject (Q)
.
The rejection of (Q) ultimately commits
Castaneda to inaccessible first-person propositional guises.
The Adams-Castaneda Correspondence
In this section I argue that Robert Adams fails to
formulate a successful counter-example to Castaneda's
principle (P). 18 I consider another version of this example
with appropriate revisions by Patrick Grim, and I conclude
that Grim's example does show that there is a problem with
Castaneda's reply to Kretzmann.
Robert Adams initially attempts to show that
Castaneda's principle (P) is implausible. Adams formulates
(P) in the following way:
(P.l) If A knows that B knows that P,
then A knows the proposition expressed
by r that P 1 in r B knows that P^ . 19
Adams claims (P.l) is no more intuitively plausible than
(P.2) below since, "... what makes [P.l] plausible is that
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the notion of truth enters implicitly into [P.l] in much the
same way that it enters explicitly into [P.2]." 2 ®
(P.2) If A knows that B is saying truly
that P, then A knows the proposition
expressed by T that P^ in ' B is sayinq
truly that P*1 . 21
Consider a case where the Editor of Soul is newly
appointed from seven candidates for the position, none of
whom are aware of the recent decision made by the Board of
Directors. All seven are in the same room together having
just heard the reading of a will bequeathing several million
dollars to the new Editor of Soul . The candidates are
chanting in unison, 'I am rich', each hoping that this is
true of himself. On the basis of these facts the following
is true:
(5) The Editor of Soul knows that the
Editor of Soul is saying truly that he
himself is rich.
From (P.2) together with (5), it follows that:
(6) The Editor of Soul knows the
proposition expressed by 'he himself is
rich' in (5)
.
Adams suggests that (6) is false given the
circumstances described in the example. In this situation
we have no reason for saying that the Editor of Soul knows
the proposition expressed by 'he himself is rich' in (5)
,
since at the time of their utterances all seven candidates
are still ignorant of whom the board has chosen to be the
new Editor. The falsity of (6), Adams claims, is evidence
that principle (P.2) should be rejected, since this
principle leads to the inference in (6). But if (P.2) is
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rejected, this is reason for rejecting (P.l) as well, since
as Adams puts it, (P.l) and (P.2) "seem equally plausible
intuitively. 1,22
The inference from (5) to (6) is problematic, in my
opinion, but not for the reasons Adams cites. What Adams
overlooks is that the embedded occurrence of the definite
description 'the Editor of Soul ' in (5) can be interpreted
either as large or small scope. Two possible readings of
(5) are:
(5a) (ji x) (x is the Editor of Soul and x
knows that x is saying truly that he
himself is rich)
.
(5b) ( 3 x) [x is the Editor of Soul and x
knows that (3 y) (y is the Editor of Soul
and y is saying truly that he himself is
rich) ]
.
Reading (5a) already implies there is an individual, x, such
that the Editor of Soul knows of this individual, that he is
saying truly that he himself is rich. But according to the
example, the Editor fails to know who has been chosen by the
Board of Directors. So, if (5) is supposed to follow from
the example as described, (5) cannot be interpreted as (5a)
.
Reading (5b)
,
however, does adequately capture this
ignorance on the part of the Editor. For (5b) merely
asserts that the Editor knows some one of the candidates in
the room is the Editor of Soul and is saying truly that he
himself is rich. However, when (5) is interpreted as (5b),
it is not clear that (6) follows from (5b) and (P.2).
Specifically, the expression in (6) that reads, "the
proposition expressed by 'he himself is rich' in (5)" fails
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to denote a unique proposition in the expansion (5b)
,
since
there is no specific assignment of value to 'y' in (5b) .
The problem with (6) can be traced to (P.2). In order
to make sense of the expression, 'the proposition expressed
by that p"7 ' in (P.2), we might revise this principle in
the following way:
(P.2*) If Tx knows that y is saying
truly that P"1 is true relative to a
context, c, where individual a is
assigned to 'x' and b is assigned to 'y'
in c, then a knows 0, where 0 is the
proposition expressed by 'that p' in c.
Once we explicitly assign a unique proposition, 0 , to 'that
P' i-n (P*2*), we see (5b) is no longer of the right form to
satisfy the antecedent of (P.2*). Since there is no
specific assignment to 'y' in (5b)
,
there is no unique
proposition expressed by 'he himself is rich' in 'y is
saying truly that he himself is rich' as this occurs in
(5b) .
Clearly, this is not the result that Adams intended
when he introduced the counter-example to principle (P.2).
However, we might try to make Adams's critical point by
using a proper name or demonstrative in place of the
embedded definite description 'the Editor of Soul ' in (5)
.
To see whether these technical difficulties can be avoided,
I borrow a counter-example formulated by Patrick Grim. 23
Grim uses this example against the original formulation of
principles (P) and (Q) in Castaneda's reply to Kretzmann.
Suppose that mess-making in grocery stores is a capital
offense, and detective McQ is the head of a law enforcement
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division assigned to track down and arrest all mess-makers.
McQ receives a message from the FBI that 'Beth Dixon knows
that she herself is making a mess'. On the basis of this
the following two sentences are true:
(7) Beth Dixon knows that she herself is
making a mess.
(8) McQ knows that Beth Dixon knows that
she herself is making a mess.
Unbeknownst to McQ, I am performing messy acts in disguise
at night, and during the day I work side by side with McQ
investigating messy shopper crimes under an alias name.
For (8) to be an instance of Castaneda's original
principle (P)
,
we must make particular assignments to the
variables in this principle. (P) can be rendered as:
(P*) If ^ x knows that y knows that
is true relative to a context c, where a
is assigned to 'x' and b is assigned to
'y' in c, and sentence 'S' expresses a
proposition / in c, then a knows j.
If we take the name 'Beth Dixon' in (7) and (8) to be a
directly referring term and not an abbreviation for some
disguised definite description, then (8) is an instance of
the antecedent of (P*)
.
From (P*) and (8) we can infer:
(9) McQ knows the proposition expressed
by 'she herself is making a mess' in
( 8 ) .
By Castaneda's principle (Q)
,
'she herself is making a mess'
in (7) and (8) is identical to the proposition expressed by:
(10) I am making a mess (uttered by Beth
Dixon )
.
24
If f by principle (Q)
,
'she herself is making a mess' in
(7) and (8) is identical to the proposition expressed by
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(10), then it follows McQ knows the same thing in (9) as I
know by (10). This result seems contrary to our intuitions
that McQ does not know I am making a mess. As Grim puts it,
"I am safe in my deception." Evidence that McQ fails to
know the same proposition I know in (10) is his failure to
arrest me for mess-making.
Grim uses this example to argue that at least one of
Castaneda's principles, either (P*) or (Q) is false. But it
seems, intuitively, that we want to retain something like
principle (Q) , since it is contrary to our ordinary way of
individuating propositions to count the propositions
expressed by (10), and the embedded clause in (7) and (8) as
different propositions. Nevertheless, Castaneda apparently
does not have these intuitions about the plausibility of (Q)
because he seeks to avoid the apparent problems raised by
Adams's counter-example by relinquishing principle (Q)
.
Adams himself suggests that his original counter-
example should be understood as an attack on Castaneda's
principle (Q) rather than (P.2), and by analogy (P.l). In a
January 4, 1980 letter to Castaneda, Adams says:
Reflection on things you say in your
letter, however, has led me to think
that the best way for you to deal with
these problems may not involve rejection
of [P.l] and [P.2] after all. In
arguing that you ought to reject them I
was assuming that it is part of your
position that, as you put it:
[Q] A quasi-indexical clause
of degree one expresses in its
oratio recta context the
identical proposition that a
corresponding indexical
sentence paired with a
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certain context of utterance
expresses
.
And I took it that you understood [Q] toimply that:
(P*) The proposition expressed
by 'he himself is rich' in
'The Editor of Soul is saying
truly that he himself is
rich
'
,
is identically the same as:
(Q*) The proposition the
Editor of Soul would express
by saying, 'I am rich'.
Apart from this assumption my example
does not prove that you ought to reject
[P.2]. It might be taken as showing
rather that the Editor of Soul can know
(P*) without knowing (Q*) . 2b
In his March 16, 1982 reply to Adams, Castaneda
welcomes Adams's attack on (Q) and renounces this
principle. 26 Though Castaneda does not have Grim's example
in mind, we can see how such a move blocks the inference
Grim regards as problematic. We are still entitled to infer
from (8) and (P*) that:
(9) McQ knows the proposition expressed
by 'she herself is making a mess' in
( 8 ) .
Yet if (Q) is false, the proposition that McQ knows, which
is attributed to him in (9), is not the very same
proposition that I, Beth Dixon, know by my utterance of 'I
am making a mess'. One might even add that McQ's failure to
know the proposition I know accounts for his failure to
arrest me for mess-making.
Inaccessible Propositional Guises
By rejecting principle (Q)
,
Castaneda has no way of
countering the Basic Argument we discussed in Chapter Two.
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It should follow from this that Castaneda is committed to
the existence of first-person propositions. But for
Castaneda, it is "propositional guises" that are the objects
of belief and knowledge. In the remainder of this chapter I
examine whether or not there is any advantage to invoking
first-person propositional guises, rather than first-person
propositions, as the objects of self-attributed belief and
knowledge
.
Consider what Castaneda says about the following three
sentences
:
(11) Before the pestilence Oedipus
believed that the previous King of
Thebes was dead.
(12) The previous King of Thebes was
(the same as) Oedipus's father.
(13) Before the pestilence Oedipus
didn't believe that Oedipus's
father was dead.
A simple analysis, . . . would be
that Oedipus, like anybody else, can
have beliefs about physical objects or
persons only under certain
characterizations. Thus, Oedipus by
[11] believes something of a certain
person X qua characterized by being the
previous King of Thebes , and by [12] he
does not believe the same (namely, that
he is dead) of person X qua
characterized by being Oedipus's
father . . . .
Because the definite descriptions of
[11-13] refer to guises . . . [14] and
[15] below are different propositions:
[14] The previous King of Thebes
was dead.
[15] Oedipus's father was dead. 27
I think we can understand what propositional guises are
like without resorting to the details of Castaneda's "Guise
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Theory". 28 The notion of a propositional guise is parasitic
on the notion of an individual guise. The definite
descriptions in sentences (11)
-(13) refer to (individual)
guises which, Castaneda suggests, present a person or
physical object to a believer by means of a property. So,
Oedipus may have a belief about a particular person under
the guise, being the previous King of Thebes , but fail to
have a belief about this same person under the guise, being
Oedipus's father . Individual guises are similar to Fregean
senses that speakers attach to proper names. Senses may
also be construed as modes of presentation of a referent to
whoever grasps that sense.
About propositional guises, Castaneda says, "We analyze
a proposition gua having a certain logical form as a
propositional guise." 29 The criterion of difference for
propositional guises appears to be like the criterion of
difference for Fregean thoughts. If Oedipus believes (14)
but fails to believe (15), then the propositions expressed
by (14) and (15) are different. For Castaneda, this amounts
to saying that (14) and (15) express different propositional
guises
.
Using propositional guises instead of propositions as
the objects of belief does not significantly affect the
Basic Argument. We have already seen that Castaneda's
research on indexical reference is the inspiration for the
Irreplacability Thesis discussed in Chapter One. It is
Castaneda's view that the embedded occurrence of 'I' in (16)
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cannot be replaced by some non-indexical name or description
that refers to Beth Dixon, salva veritate . ^0
(16) I believe that I am late for class
(uttered by Beth Dixon)
.
Castaneda also accepts a two-place relation of belief—but
one relating a believer to a propositional guise, rather
than a proposition. The embedded clause in (16) expresses a
first-person propositional guise, and this guise is not
identical to the propositional guise expressed by the
embedded clause in (17), where 'T' in (17) is replaced by
some non-indexical name or description referring to Beth
Dixon.
(17) I believe that T is late for class
(uttered by Beth Dixon)
.
We might also say, as we did in the Basic Argument, that the
proposition expressed by the embedded clause in (16) is not
identical to the proposition expressed by ' T is late for
class ' when this latter proposition is the object of belief
for someone other than Beth Dixon. In this case, since only
I, the speaker of (16), can use 'I' to refer to myself, it
follows that only I can believe the first-person
propositional guise I believe in (16) . Castaneda, it seems,
is committed to the inaccessibility of first-person
propositional guises for the same reasons that I have argued
Kretzmann and Grim are committed to the inaccessibility of
first-person propositions.
52
This result comes as no surprise to Castaneda. in a
letter to Adams (March 16, 1982), Castaneda quotes Adams as
saying:
If exclusively indexical propositions
[i.e. strictly indexical propositional
guises] are among the objects of
knowledge, nothing that it makes sense
to think of someone distinct from me as
possibly knowing could be precisely the
same thing I know in knowing who I am. 31
Castaneda goes on to say:
Your last point is excellent. It
captures very well a central commitment
of perceptual Guise Theory to the strict
privacy of all indexical references,
even to the point of postulating (as
others, e.g., Bertrand Russell, have
done before) private perceptual
fields
.
32
Problems for Propositional Guises
Castaneda invokes first-person propositional guises in
his analysis of first-person indexical sentences. These
guises are like first-person propositions in the following
respect. According to principle (FP)
,
only the speaker of
an indexical sentence containing 'I' can entertain the
first-person proposition expressed by that sentence.
According to Castaneda's analysis, only the speaker of an
indexical sentence containing 'I' can entertain the first-
person propositional guise expressed by that sentence. So,
invoking propositional guises as the objects of belief does
not offer any advantage over first-person propositions. We
are still left with inaccessible beliefs, when beliefs are
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identified with the second term of the belief relation—
a
propositional guise.
Moreover, Castaneda's analysis of self-attribution is
even less compelling than any analysis of belief that
appeals to first-person propositions. By rejecting
principle (Q)
,
Castaneda is committed to saying that a
first-person propositional guise is not identical to any
quasi-indexical propositional guise. If propositional
guises are the objects of belief, then first-person
propositional guises are individuated too narrowly to play a
satisfactory role in explanations of behavior. For example,
from Castaneda's version of the Basic Argument, no one but I
can believe the propositional guise expressed by my
utterance of:
(18) I am late for class.
Moreover, because Castaneda rejects principle (Q)
,
the
propositional guise expressed by (18) is not identical to
the embedded clause in (19)
.
(19) Beth Dixon believes that she
herself is late for class.
This consequence has very little to recommend it.
Suppose I sincerely utter (18) as I rush out of my
office and down the hall. It is natural to try to explain
my behavior by appealing to what I believe. In this case,
what explains my frantic departure is the belief I attribute
to myself in the following sentence:
(16) I believe that I am late for class.
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Any of my colleagues who overhear my utterance of (18) are
in a position to explain why I acted on the basis of what I
believe. Ordinarily, we think they can do so by uttering(19)
. But on Castaneda's analysis my colleagues do not
attribute the very same belief to me in (19) as I attribute
to myself in (16). Uttering (19) may not be sufficient for
explaining my reasons for acting, and this seems contrary to
our intuitions about the relation between sentences (16) and
(19) —that they attribute to me the same belief.
While Castaneda acknowledges the inaccessibility
brought about by his theory of first-person indexical
reference, he is not altogether reconciled to the problems
it raises. For example, in "Knowledge and Self: A
Correspondence," Adams and Castaneda concur that rejecting
(Q) does not have the theological implications Kretzmann
describes, because "We can still say that God knows all the
quasi-indexical propositions. In an important sense he
knows all the facts . . ," 33 Castaneda may be trying to
extricate himself from the consequences of inaccessible
propositional guises. I do not believe he does so
successfully. By his comment, Adams presumably means that
God and finite beings can know a quasi-indexical
propositional guise in the following way. Suppose these two
sentences are true:
(20) Beth Dixon knows that she herself
is late for class.
(21) Sam knows that Beth Dixon knows
that she herself is late for class.
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By Castaneda's principle (P*)
,
Sam knows the propositional
guise expressed by 'she herself is late for class' in (20).
According to Adams and Castaneda, knowing this guise puts
Sam in a position to know "the fact" corresponding to the
first-person propositional guise expressed by my utterance
of ' I am late for class'. But it is only according to some
extended sense of 'fact' that Sam knows the same thing I
know in knowing the first-person propositional guise
expressed by (18). Since it is propositional guises that
are the objects of belief, and Castaneda denies the strict
identity between first-person and quasi-indexical
propositional guises, Sam (or anyone other than me) fails to
know exactly what I know in knowing (18) . Castaneda tries
to have it both ways by claiming that first-person
propositional guises and their quasi-indexical counterparts
are not strictly identical; and also, that knowledge of a
quasi-indexical propositional guise constitutes knowledge of
"the fact" corresponding to the first-person propositional
guise. If Castaneda chooses to analyze sentences containing
propositional attitude verbs as two-place relations between
an individual and a propositional guise, then there will be
no such thing as knowing a "fact" independently of being
presented with that fact by means of some propositonal guise
or other. And, there is no guise that is identical to the
one I know in (18)
.
Moreover, even if Castaneda can articulate a sense of
'fact' that makes it plausible Sam and I know the same
56
thing, Castaneda cannot appeal to these facts to avoid
inaccessibility when we consider sentences that contain
psychological verbs other than 'knows'. Castaneda needs
(P*) to infer that Sam knows the propositional guise
expressed by 'she herself is late for class' in (21). But
(P*) is not true if we replace 'knows' in (P*) with
believes', and I suspect it fails for other cognitive verbs
as well. From the truth of:
(22) Beth Dixon believes that Mary
believes that the moon is made of green
cheese.
it does not follow that:
(23) Beth Dixon believes that the moon
is made of green cheese.
Because there is no corresponding transitivity principle
(like (P*)) for 'believes', 34 it does not follow that anyone
other than Beth Dixon can believe even the quasi-indexical
propositional guise expressed by 'she herself is late for
class' in:
(19) Beth Dixon believes that she
herself is late for class.
In general, no one other than I can believe what I believe
by uttering a first-person indexical sentence.
By introducing into our ontology propositional guises
as the objects of belief and knowledge, we are committed to
the same kind of privileged access entailed by first-person
propositions. This privacy creates problems for our
ordinary way of reporting about the beliefs of others, and
our explanations of their behavior. I see no advantage to
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invoking propositional guises rather than propositions in
the analysis of self-attribution. If anything, the
inaccessibility created by guises is more problematic
because first-person and guasi-indexical propositional
guises are not identical. This individuates the objects of
belief and knowledge even more narrowly than first-person
propositions. For these reasons I recommend examining
another way to analyze self-attributed belief. In Person
and Object . Chisholm also analyzes self-attribution as a
two-place relation, but the objects of psychological
attitudes are propositions that entail individual essences.
I turn next to a discussion of Chisholm's proposal.
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CHAPTER 4
INDIVIDUAL ESSENCES
Introduction
In Person and Obnect . ^ Chisholm devotes a chapter to
"The Direct Awareness of the Self." In the course of
describing the epistemic relation that holds between
individuals and the states of affairs they think about,
Chisholm singles out belief about oneself for special
attention. Chisholm's definition of self-attribution given
below entails that propositions that are self-presenting and
imply an individual essence are the objects of self-
attributed belief. On the basis of this definition, and
other remarks Chisholm makes about the first-person
indexical, I attribute to him an argument for the existence
of first-person propositions.
In a later work, 2 Chisholm attempts to discredit his
earlier commitment to individual essences. I argue that his
precise criticisms are not entirely successful. However,
there are other reasons for thinking that propositions that
contain individual concepts are not well suited to be the
objects of self-attributed belief.
Self-Attribution
In Person and Object 3 Chisholm offers the following
definition of self-attributed belief:
D.I.ll S believes himself to be F =Df
There is an individual essence C such
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that (a) a proposition implying S to
have C is self-presenting for S and (b)
S accepts a proposition which entails
the conjunction of C and the property of
being F. 4
To understand Chisholm's analysis it is useful to see what
it means for a proposition to imply that an individual has a
particular property, and how Chisholm defines the terms
'individual essence' and 'self-presenting'. An 'individual
essence', or 'haecceity' is defined this way:
D.I.5 G is an individual essence (or
haecceity) =Df G is a property which is
such that, for every x, x has G if and
only if x is necessarily such that it
has G, and it is impossible that there
is a y other than x such that y has G. 5
Chisholm suggests the property being identical with me
is an individual essence. Specifically, in a footnote he
says 'being identical with me' has as its intention 6 my
essence, while on another occasion used by a different
person, it has her essence as its intention. 7
According to Chisholm a proposition or state of affairs
may imply, with respect to some particular thing, that it
has a certain property.
D.I.6 P implies x to have the property
of being F =Df There is a property G
such that (i) G is an individual
concept, (ii) P entails the conjunction
of G and the property of being F, and
(iii) x has G. 8
Some further clarification may be needed to understand
D.I.6. An individual concept is a property that only one
thing can have at a time. For example, being the tallest
man is an individual concept. All individual essences are
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individual concepts, but not all individual concepts are
individual essences.
Chisholm characterizes propositions as noncontingent
things that are either true or false absolutely.
Propositions are a subspecies of states of affairs.
D.IV.3 P is a proposition =Df p is a
state of affairs, and it is impossible
that there is a time t and a time t'
such that p occurs at t and does not
occur at t '
.
9
True propositions are states of affairs that occur, while
false propositions are states of affairs that do not
occur. 10 States of affairs, in turn, are characterized by
Chisholm as intentional objects:
D.IV.l P is a state of affairs =Df It is
possible that there is someone who
accepts p. 11
The details of the ontology of states of affairs need not
concern us here. For our purposes, we may treat
propositions and states of affairs as the same kinds of
things. 12 In D.I.ll and D.I.6, Chisholm speaks of a
proposition entailing a property. This notion he defines
as
:
D.I.3 P entails the property of being F
=Df P is necessarily such that (i) if it
obtains then something has the property
of being F and (ii) whoever accepts P
believes that something is F. 13
There is still one remaining term in D.I.ll that has
not yet been explicated. Chisholm defines a self-presenting
state of affairs in the following way:
D.I.l h is such that it is self-
presenting to S at t =Df h occurs at t
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and is necessarily such that, whenever
it occurs, then it is certain for s. 14
Examples of self-presenting states of affairs are my feeling
depressed at a particular time, or my seeming to see many
people at a particular time. For a proposition, P, to be
sel f"Presenting to me at a time means that P is true at that
time, and it is necessary that if p is true, then P is
certain for me. In general, the propositions that are self-
presenting are about our own mental states when we are
"
• * • thinking certain thoughts, entertaining certain ideas
and having certain sensory experiences." 15 Moreover, if a
person knows some self-presenting proposition about herself
at a time, then she is directly acquainted with herself—she
has 'direct knowledge' of herself. 16
Chisholm invokes individual essences in the definition
of self-attribution D.I.ll because he wishes to distinguish
the way in which we individuate ourselves from the way in
which we individuate things other than ourselves. According
to Chisholm, there is a way of individuating a particular
thing that does not require identifying that thing in
relation to anything else. He calls this 'individuation per
se ' .
D.I.10 S individuates x per se =Df There
is a p such that (i) p is known by S,
(ii) there is a property p implies x to
have, and (iii) there is no individual
thing y such that y is other than x and
there is a property p implies y to
have. 17
Chisholm argues that the most likely candidate for each
person to individuate in this way is herself.
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If I do individuate myself per se then
there are propositions which are such
that: I know them to be true; they imply
some property that I have uniquely; and
they do not imply any property that any
other individual thing has uniquely.
What property, then, could it be that I
thus know myself to have uniquely and
that does not pick me out merely by
relating me uniquely to some other
individual thing? It can only be the
property of being me or being identical
with myself .^- 8
The reference to individual essences in the definition of
self-attribution suggests that if anyone self-attributes a
belief, she individuates herself 'per se'.
First-Person Propositions
At various places in Person and Object Chisholm
suggests that each person has privileged access to the
propositions that imply her own individual essence. In this
section I explain how Chisholm's analysis of self-
attribution commits him to the existence of propositions
that only one person can believe or know.
Consider Chisholm's comments in the following passage:
The theory of the use of the first
person pronoun—for example, 'I'—that
fits most naturally with what I have
suggested is the following. Each person
who uses the first person pronoun uses
it to refer to himself and in such a way
that, in that use, its Bedeutung or
reference is himself and its Sinn or
intention is his own individual
essence. A corollary would be that,
whereas each person knows directly and
immediately certain propositions
implying his own individual essence, no
one knows any propositions implying the
individual essence of anyone else.
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Chisholm says here that the intention of 'I', as it is
used on a particular occasion, is the speaker's individual
essence. I suspect Chisholm makes this claim to indicate
the role that individual essences play in self-
identification. Suppose I assert a sentence that contains
an occurrence of 'I', as in the sentence, 'I am rich'.
Regardless of whether this sentence is true, I may still
individuate myself successfully as the thing to which I
attribute the property being rich . I individuate myself
(per se) in virtue of having a property uniquely that does
not also relate me to any other thing. This property is
being identical with myself , which is my individual essence.
Chisholm also claims that ".
. . each person knows
directly and immediately certain propositions implying his
own individual essence." The propositions that I know
directly and immediately are self-presenting propositions.
For example, if I feel depressed at a particular time, then
the proposition I feel depressed is self-presenting to me at
that time according to definition D.I.l. And, this
proposition implies me to have a certain property. By
definition D.I.6, there is an individual concept of me that
is entailed by this self-presenting proposition. This
individual concept is my individual essence, being identical
with me . 20
From definition D.I.ll it is clear that I know
"directly and immediately" certain propositions that imply
my individual essence because these propositions are self-
67
presenting to me. But it is not obvious why Chisholm says
in the above quotation that
. .no one knows any
propositions implying the individual essence of anyone
else." It is true that no one but Beth Dixon can know
directly the propositions that are self-presenting to me
because no one but I can be directly acquainted with my
mental states. But Chisholm does not include the
qualification 'directly' in any of the places where he
discusses this point . 21 My interpretation of Chisholm's
comment is that he holds the stronger thesis: no one but
Beth Dixon can know simoliciter any proposition that implies
my individual essence. Chisholm does not say explicitly why
no one but I can know the propositions that imply my
individual essence, but since his comments suggest that he
endorses first-person propositions, it is worth speculating
about how and why Chisholm was led to this conclusion.
I maintain that the best explanation for Chisholm's
remarks about privileged access is that he holds the
following: only declarative sentences containing a first-
person indexical expression referring to an individual x,
express propositions that entail the individual essence of x
on a particular occasion. To see this, consider the
evidence that Chisholm holds: (a) all declarative sentences
containing a first-person indexical expression referring to
an individual x, entail the individual essence of x.
Suppose I assert the sentence 'I am rich'. If I
believe what I say, then I imply myself to have the property
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being rich. Consequently, it is true that Beth Dixon
believes herself to be rich. According to D.I.ll, it
follows that there is a proposition that is self
—presenting
to me
—
perhaps it is the proposition, mv believing that I am
rich—and I accept a proposition that entails the
conjunction of my individual essence being identical with
myself, and the property being rich . Accordingly, any time
I assert a first-person declarative sentence attributing a
property to myself, and I believe what I say, it is true at
that time that I imply myself to have a certain property,
and by D.I.ll, I accept a proposition that entails my
individual essence.
Though the evidence is less clear, I also believe that
Chisholm holds: (b) no declarative sentence that does not
contain an occurrence of a first-person indexical expression
referring to x, entails the individual essence of x.
Consider the case where I assert the sentence 'Beth Dixon is
rich'. If I believe what I say, then I believe and accept
the proposition Beth Dixon is rich . But this proposition
does not entail my individual essence, since it is not the
case that the proposition Beth Dixon is rich is necessarily
such that if I accept this proposition, then I believe that
something has the property being identical with myself . I
may accept the proposition Beth Dixon is rich , but have no
beliefs about myself, whatsoever, if I fail to believe that
I am Beth Dixon . 22
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In fact, according to Chisholm's criterion of identity
for states of affairs, the state of affairs (or proposition)
my beinq rich is not identical to the proposition that would
be expressed by a sentence ^ T is rich"1 where 'T' is a name
or description that refers to me, and that does not contain
any occurrence of a first-person indexical. To see this,
consider Chisholm's definition of the entailment relation
that holds for states of affairs.
D.IV.2 p entails q =Df p is necessarily
such that (a) if it obtains then q
obtains and (b) whoever accepts it
accepts q. 23
Chisholm articulates a criterion of identity for states of
affairs as follows:
. . . if a state of affairs p is
identical with a state of affairs q,
then p entails q and q entails p. 2 ^
The state of affairs mv being rich is not identical to
the state of affairs Beth Dixon beinq rich , since the former
does not entail the latter. I may accept the proposition I
am rich , but fail to believe that Beth Dixon is rich, and
hence, fail to accept the proposition Beth Dixon is rich
because I fail to believe that I am Beth Dixon. As in
previous examples we have discussed, the explanation for
this circumstance may be that I am suffering from amnesia.
By the same token, another person, S, may accept the
proposition Beth Dixon is rich , but fail to accept the
proposition expressed by my utterance of ' I am rich' because
S fails to believe that I am Beth Dixon. In general, the
proposition expressed by my utterance of 'I am rich' does
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not entail the proposition expressed by f T is rich
-
!
,
where
'
T' is replaced by some unique designation of me, not
containing any occurrence of a first-person indexical
—
regardless of who utters the latter sentence.
This reasoning is reminiscent of the Irreplacability
Thesis. Recall that (IT) says: if 'I' occurs in a sentence
embedded behind a propositional attitude verb, and 'I' is
replaced by some co-referential name or description not
containing a first-person indexical, then it is always
possible for the resulting sentence to differ in truth-
value. Chisholm does not explicitly argue for this claim
about the failure of substitution for 'I' in Person and
Obi ect
.
but it is suggested by various comments he makes
throughout his discussion of self-attribution. For example,
in considering the claim that I individuate myself per se,
Chisholm writes in a footnote:
Putting the matter in terms of language,
we could say, with Sydney Shoemaker: 'In
no sense do I use the word "I" as an
abbreviation for any physical
description of myself. If it should
turn out that I am having an
hallucination, and that the description
"the tall man sitting at the
typewriter" does not apply to me, I
would have to withdraw or amend the
statement "The tall man sitting at the
typewriter has a toothache," but would
not have to withdraw or amend my
statement "I have a toothache ."' 25
My interpretation of this passage is that Chisholm
wishes to emphasize that the occurrence of 'I' in a
declarative sentence I assert guarantees that I individuate
myself per se, in virtue of my accepting a proposition that
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entails my individual essence. This may not constitute an
explicit endorsement of (IT), but at the very least,
Chisholm's account of the entailment relations between
states of affairs has the consequence that no declarative
sentence that does not contain an occurrence of a first-
person indexical referring to x, entails the individual
essence of x . 26
I have argued that Chisholm is committed to the truth
of (a) and (b) above, and is thereby committed to the truth
of the following thesis: only declarative sentences
containing a first-person indexical expression referring to
an individual x, express propositions that entail the
individual essence of x on a particular occasion. If I am
right to interpret Chisholm in this way, then we are closer
to understanding why Chisholm claims that ". . .no one
knows any propositions implying the individual essence of
anyone else ." 27
No one but I can use a first-person indexical
expression to refer to me. Anyone else must use some other
designation of me, such as 'Beth Dixon' or 'she'. But by
the previous argument, no sentence that does not contain a
first-person indexical expression referring to me, expresses
a proposition that is identical to a proposition that
entails my individual essence, regardless of who utters such
a sentence. So, only I can believe or know the propositions
that entail my individual essence, since only I can accept
the propositions expressed by my utterances of first-person
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indexical sentences. As in the Basic Argument of Chapter
Two, we must assume that an individual cannot believe or
know a proposition unless she can utter a sentence that
expresses that proposition. In this way, individuals who
se ^
f
-attribute a belief by means of a first-person indexical
sentence have privileged access to the propositions that
imply their own individual essence. These propositions are
first-person propositions according to the definition (FP)
in Chapter Two.
Doing Away with Individual Essences
In this section I consider a criticism that Chisholm
makes about his earlier view of self-attribution in Person
and Object . I show that this argument is not conclusive,
though I concur with Chisholm that we are better off without
individual essences.
Chisholm himself is the harshest critic of the theory
of self-attribution we have just described. In The First
Person
.
he says:
. . . I had previously defended the view
that, for each person, that person's use
of 'I' is such that he is its referent
and his individual essence or haecceity
is its sense. I said, in effect, that
'Jones believes that he himself is wise'
tells us this: 'Jones has an individual
essence H; he accepts a proposition
which is certain for him and
necessarily such that it is true if and
only if whatever has H is wise'. I,
too, suggested that no one is able to
grasp the ' I ' -propositions of any other
person
.
This view is plausible only if it is
plausible to suppose that there are ' I '
—
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propositions. And, as we have seen, the
most plausible version of the thesis
that there are ' I '
-propositions
presupposes that there are individual
essences and that each person can
readily grasp his own; but we are now
sceptical about these presuppositions. 28
In this next passage Chisholm describes his reasons for
being sceptical about individual essences.
It seems doubtful that I can ever be
said thus to grasp thus (sic) my own
individual essence or haecceity. If I
were able to grasp it, shouldn't I also
be able to single out its various marks?
Perhaps I can single out some of the
marks of my individual essence— if I
have one. Thus it may include various
universal essential properties (for
example, being red or non-red, or being
a musician if a violinist) . And perhaps
I can single out certain non-universal
essential properties (for example, being
an individual thing and being a person)
.
But if I can grasp my individual
essence, then I ought also to be able to
single out in it those features that are
unigue to it. If 'being identical with
me' is my individual essence and 'being
identical with you' is yours, then,
presumably, each analyzes into
personhood and something else as well
—
one something else in my case and
another in yours—but I haven't the
faintest idea what this something else
might be. 29
In this passage Chisholm seems to be reasoning in the
following way:
(1) If there exist individual essences,
then they must be such that they are
grasped (or conceived)
.
(2) Individual essences are not grasped
(or conceived)
.
(3)
Therefore, there do not exist
individual essences.
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Following Jaegwon Kim in his review of The First Person
r
30 i
take Chisholm's concept of 'grasping' to be synonymous with
the concept of 'conceiving'. Conceiving is one of the
undefined primitives in the ontology presented in The First
Person . Chisholm explains that the concept of conceiving is
inseparably connected" with the concept of a property.
Specifically:
(PI) Every property is possibly such
that there is someone who conceives
it. 31
Principle (PI) provides some justification for premise (1).
Since individual essences are defined as properties, (PI)
requires that they be conceivable.
Premise (2) states that individual essences are not
conceived. Chisholm reasons in the following way: Suppose
two people, S and S* utter the sentence 'I am standing'.
According to the definition of self-attribution in Person
and Object , the proposition S accepts implies S's individual
essence, and the proposition S* accepts implies S*'s
individual essence. Call S's individual essence 'Hs ' and
S*'s individual essence 'Hs *'. If individual essences are
properties that a person has uniquely, then there must be
something that distinguishes Hs from Hs *. In one sense,
when both S and S* report 'I am standing' they believe
different things. And, the difference between what S and S*
believe can be explained by the difference between their
individual essences. We might try to explain this by
assuming essences are analyzable into their constituent
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partis, and that conceiving an individual essence involves
conceiving its constituents. The problem with such an
account, Chisholm argues, is that S does not know what
constituents of Hs make this essence different from Hs *, as
well as all other individual essences. Chisholm actually
makes this claim on behalf of himself only—that "I haven't
the faintest idea what [features are unique to my own
individual essence]." 32 But the implicit inference is that
no one else is in a more privileged position with respect to
grasping or conceiving the constituents of her own
individual essence.
Chisholm gives us one example of an individual essence
that is not conceived—his own. But this falls short of the
stronger claim in (2)
,
that no individual essences are
conceived. Chisholm's reasoning leaves open the possibility
that someone other than Chisholm can determine what makes
her own essence different from others. The truth of (2) has
not been established definitively, nor has the conclusion
that there do not exist individual essences.
Perhaps Chisholm only wishes to cast suspicion on the
existence of individual essences, for he concludes his
discussion of essences in the following way:
We have these two options, then, so
far as individual essences are
concerned. First, we could say that,
although each of us has an individual
essence, these individual essences
involve certain properties that are
'unanalysable' and yet also such as to
be restricted to a single thing. But if
'being identical with me' implies
personhood, then it is at least
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partially analysable. Hence we would
have to say that my individual essence
contains an unanalysable part—and it
is in that unanalysable part that the
difference between my individual essence
and yours is to be found.
The second possibility is to say
that we have been too readily attracted
to the assumption that each individual
has an individual essence that he can
grasp. This latter course seems to be
the right one . 33
Chisholm is right to opt for an alternative theory of
self-attribution that does not invoke individual essences.
The reason for this is not simply the inconceivability of
these essences, but because individual concepts, in general,
do not explain self-identification in cases where a believer
uses 'I' to self-attribute a belief. I take up this point
in the last section of this chapter.
Even if we concede Chisholm's argument against
individual essences, his case is even less persuasive
against first-person propositions. According to Chisholm,
".
. . the most plausible version of the thesis that there
are ' I ' -propositions presupposes that there are individual
essences and that each person can readily grasp his own ." 34
This comment suggests that the argument against the
conceivability of individual essences is, indirectly, an
argument against first-person propositions. But this is not
necessarily true. The argument for first-person
propositions I have attributed to Chisholm in the previous
section is not significantly affected by dropping talk of
individual essences altogether. To see this, suppose the
following sentence is true:
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(4) I believe that I am rich (uttered by
Beth Dixon)
.
Sentence (4) relates me to the proposition expressed by 'I
am rich' in (4). In Chisholm's terminology, I accept the
proposition expressed by 'I am rich' in (4), and this
proposition entails the property of being rich . Call the
proposition I accept ' p ' . • As we saw in the previous
section, Chisholm's criterion of identity for propositions
(states of affairs) has it that / is not identical to the
proposition expressed by ^ T is rich"1
,
where "I" is a name
or description referring to me, not containing any
occurrence of a first-person indexical. This is so because
0 does not entail the proposition expressed by ^ T is rich~*
when an appropriate replacement for 'T' is made. 35
Moreover, it is a matter of grammatical fact that only I can
use the indexical 'I' to refer to myself. So, only I can
believe 0, the proposition I am rich . It still follows on
Chisholm's account that the proposition I accept, namely
,
is a first-person proposition. Hence, Chisholm's rejection
of individual essences in The First Person does not directly
jeopardize the existence of first-person propositions.
Doing Away with Individual Concepts
The difficulty with Chisholm's proposal for analyzing
self-attribution is not simply that individual essences are
inconceivable. But rather, that propositions containing any
individual concept are not well suited to be the objects of
indexical belief.
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The role of individual essences in Chisholm's analysis
of self-attribution is to explain how we identify ourselves.
As Chisholm tells us, individual essences are the 'sense' or
'intention' of 'I' on a particular occasion . 36 We might
understand 'sense' in this context to be something like
Frege's notion of a mode of presentation of a referent,
where grasping the sense of an expression is a method for
determining the referent of that expression. So, if an
individual essence is the sense of 'I' on a particular
occasion, then a believer grasps this essence, and
identifies herself as the unique thing that has the property
being identical with me . Of course, if individual essences
are not conceivable, then they cannot be appealed to as the
concepts that believers grasp by way of identifying
themselves. But there is another more general problem with
using any individual concept to explain how a speaker
identifies herself in cases of self-attribution.
Suppose I do know some property or properties that I
have necessarily and uniquely. Then I may specify that I
have these properties by means of a definite description
that uniquely refers to me. But if the sense of 'I' is
specifiable by a definite description true of me that does
not contain an occurrence of a first-person indexical, then
it will always be possible for me to fail to believe that I
am the person referred to by that description. So, even if
I can conceive of the properties I have necessarily and
uniquely, it is possible that I will fail to believe I have
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these properties. The problem in this case is not that I am
unable to conceive my individual essence, but that there is
no individual concept specifiable by a definite description
that I will always believe I have. Hence, first-person
propositions that contain such individual concepts do not
explain self-identification any better than propositions
that contain individual essences.
What this shows is that Chisholm's attempt to explain
self-identification by his analysis of self-attribution is
inadequate. We cannot use individual concepts (individual
essences, or otherwise) to explain how a speaker identifies
herself when she utters a first-person indexical sentence.
However, it may still turn out that first-person
propositions are Fregean propositions containing senses as
constituents. There is an alternative theory of Fregean
'
I '
-propositions that allows senses to be specified by
something other than a definite description uniquely
identifying the speaker. In the next chapter I examine
Gareth Evans's proposal for analyzing self-attribution. It
may be our last attempt to make out an acceptable analysis
of self-attribution that preserves the two-place relation of
belief between a believer and a proposition.
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CHAPTER 5
PRIVATE THOUGHTS
Introduction
In "The Thought: A Logical Inquiry," 1 Frege makes
certain remarks about the indexical 'I* that suggest he
believed in the existence of thoughts only one person can
grasp. In this chapter I discuss an interpretation of Frege
on indexicals by Gareth Evans. Evans's analysis of self-
attribution is worth exploring because it does not entail
the existence of propositional guises or individual
essences. But as I show, Evans attributes to Frege the view
that 'I' -thoughts—the thoughts expressed by indexical
sentences containing 'I'—are private and incommunicable. I
argue that Perry's three-place relation of belief does not
obviously lead to inaccessible Fregean thoughts or beliefs,
despite Evans's claim that Perry's analysis is a "notional
variant" of his own.
Frege and ' I
'
Frege says little about demonstrative and indexical
expressions, and what he does say is not easy to reconcile
with his other claims about the role of senses and thoughts
in his philosophy of language. 2 One example of this is
Frege's failure to provide a unifying theory of
demonstratives. In "The Thought," Frege says that one and
the same thought will be expressed by an utterance of 'Today
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is sunny', and 'Yesterday was sunny' uttered on the
following day.
If someone wants to say the same today
as he expressed yesterday using the word
'today', we must replace this word with
'yesterday'. Although the thought is
the same its verbal expression must be
different so that the sense, which would
otherwise by affected by the different
times of utterance, is readjusted . 3
While Frege indicates that we can express the same thought
by an appropriate exchange of the expressions 'here' and
'there ', 4 he resists extending this claim to the indexical
'I'. Consider the following passage—one of the few where
Frege seems explicitly concerned with the indexical 'I':
Now everyone is presented to himself in
a particular and primitive way, in which
he is presented to no-one else. So,
when Dr. Lauben thinks that he has been
wounded, he will probably take as a
basis this primitive way in which he is
presented to himself. And only Dr.
Lauben himself can grasp thoughts
determined in this way. But now he may
want to communicate with others. He
cannot communicate a thought which he
alone can grasp. Therefore, if he now
says 'I have been wounded', he must use
the 'I' in a sense which can be grasped
by others, perhaps in the sense of 'he
who is speaking to you at this moment',
by doing which he makes the associated
conditions of his utterance serve for
the expression of his thought . 5
Frege is maintaining that no other indexical may be
exchanged for 'I' that will express the same thought Lauben
grasps. Moreover, the thought Lauben understands when he
thinks he himself has been wounded can be grasped only by
Lauben. It is incommunicable to all others. What Frege
means can be explained in the following way.
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If Lauben thinks he has been wounded, then he is
disposed to utter the sentence 'I have been wounded'. For
Frege, the sense of the sentence 'I have been wounded' is a
thought that is a function of the sense of 'I' and the sense
of 'have been wounded '. 6 If the sense of 'I' represents
what Frege describes as the "particular and primitive way"
in which only Lauben is presented to himself, then the
thought expressed by the sentence Lauben is disposed to
utter— 'I have been wounded'—contains this special sense as
a constituent. But Frege leads us to believe that the sense
of 'I' is incommunicable, since Lauben might choose to
communicate the fact that he has been wounded by
associating a different sense with 'I', such as, 'he who is
speaking to you at this moment'. The implication is that
there are two kinds of senses for 'I' and the speaker may
associate different senses with this word. This is not
unlike what Frege says about proper names—that different
speakers may associate different senses with a name . 7 But
Frege does not suggest there are incommunicable senses that
attach to proper names.
If no one but Lauben can think of Lauben by means of
the sense he attaches to his own use of ' I', and this sense
is a constituent of the thought expressed by 'I have been
wounded' as Lauben is disposed to utter this sentence, then
the thought expressed is inaccessible to all but Lauben
himself. This reading is consistent with Frege's claim that
"... only Dr. Lauben himself can grasp thoughts determined
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in this way." Similarly, the definition of a first-person
proposition proposed in Chapter Two states that a first-
person proposition can be an object of thought only for the
speaker of the sentence expressing that proposition.
Although (FP ) 8 does not explicitly mention Fregean senses,
it is general enough to accommodate such entities. This
reading of Frege implies that when Dr. Lauben thinks to
himself or utters 'I have been wounded' and associates with
'I' the primitive sense for himself, Lauben expresses a
thought only he can grasp—or, a first-person proposition.
The Sense of 'I'
In "Understanding Demonstratives " 9 Gareth Evans invokes
a non-standard conception of sense to explain Frege's
comments about ' I '
.
Evans suggests that to grasp the sense
of a singular term is to think of the referent of this term
in a particular way. Other philosophers have thought that
senses are modes of presentation that determine a referent,
but what is different about Evans's reading of Frege is his
insistence that senses do not exist independently of their
referents
.
. . . on the present conception, the
sense of a singular term is a way of
thinking about a particular object:
something that obviously could not exist
if that object did not exist to be
thought about. If we take seriously
Frege's metaphor of sense as a mode of
presentation of reference, we shall not
expect to be provided with
specifications of sense save by means of
specifications of reference ... 10
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The biggest challenge to Evans's interpretation of
Fregean senses are those passages where Frege talks about
the senses of sentences that contain empty singular terms
—
terms that have no referent. Evans attempts to show Frege
regarded such terms as abnormal occurrences, and that the
primary notion of sense operative in Frege is one where the
senses of expressions present an existent referent
.
11 I
will not argue this textual point here. I am more
interested in evaluating Evans's interpretation of Fregean
senses when they are characterized as "ways of thinking" of
objects.
Evans supposes there are various ways of thinking about
objects, and these ways of -thinking are relations between a
person and an object. These relations are individuated
according to the kind of object a person thinks about. For
example, —a way of thinking about oneself—must be a
different kind of relation than R2—a way of thinking about
a particular day, today.
About the sense of 'I' Evans proposes:
['I'] as uttered [by a person, s]
,
has a
completing sense if and only if there is
some particular way in which one must
think of the referent [s] in order to
understand the utterance containing
it . 12
'I am F' as said by a person, s, expresses a thought that
consists of the ordered pair of the incomplete sense ' ( c^~)
is F' and the completing sense expressed by 'I' as uttered
by s. S grasps the sense of 'I' if and only if s satisfies
this relational property:
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(P) /Vcr-l^s)) .
Evans provides a necessary condition only for R x obtaining:
(
P
' ) Ri(S',S) only if S' = S . 13
(
P
*
)
tells us that identity is a necessary condition for
satisfying the relation R^. Since Evans believes that R-^ is
a way of thinking about oneself, S must be capable of self-
conscious thought. But we can see that the relation of
identity is not a sufficient condition for R 1 obtaining
since if S is identical to S', it does not follow that S is
thinking of herself in some primitive way, or even that S is
thinking at all.
Evans refers to R 1 as an "unspecified relation ." 14
Perhaps he means he is unable to specify the sufficient
conditions for a person to stand in relation R^ to herself.
Since this relation plays an important role in the
characterization of ' I ' -thoughts, it is worth investigating
what Evans has in mind by introducing R^ . One point Evans
is clear about is that R^ represents a way of thinking of
oneself that is not reducible to any other way of thinking,
"... particularly not to any which exploit knowledge of a
description of the object." 1 ^ Evans has more to say about
self-identification in The Varieties of Reference . 16
We are not interested in all thoughts
which a subject may have 'about
himself', for presumably a person may
think about someone who is in fact
himself without realizing that he is
doing so. Oedipus was thinking about
Oedipus, that is to say, himself, when
he thought that the slayer of Laius
should be killed; but Oedipus was not
thinking about himself 'self-
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consciously' (this is just a label for
the kind of thinking which interests
us)
,
because he did not realize that he
was the slayer of Laius.
^
To think of oneself self-consciously is not to think of
oneself by means of some descriptive concept, as Oedipus
thought of himself under the description 'the slayer of
Laius'. Evans's reasoning has a familiar ring. The Basic
Argument of Chapter Two makes use of a premise that
restricts substitution of embedded occurrences of 'I' for
some description true of the speaker—what I have earlier
referred to as the Irreplacability Thesis . 18 Evans seems to
accept some version of this premise at the level of
thoughts, rather than expressions, in order to single out
self-conscious thought from other ways of thinking of
oneself
.
What is it for Oedipus to realize that
he is the slayer of Laius? One thing
seems clear; it is not to realize that
the $ is the slayer of Laius, for any
descriptive concept It is not to
realize that the son of Jocasta is the
slayer of Laius, or that the man who
answered the riddle of the Sphinx is the
slayer of Laius, because Oedipus might
realize these things without realizing
that he is the slayer of Laius (not
knowing that, or having forgotten that,
he is the son of Jocasta or the man who
answered the Sphinx's riddle); and he
might realize that he is the slayer of
Laius without realizing these things,
for the same reason.^
Because Oedipus is not disposed to utter 'I am the
slayer of Laius', but is disposed to utter '( is the slayer
of Laius', (where j is some description referring to
Oedipus)
,
(IT) would allow us to infer there is no
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description that can be substituted for 'I' in this context.
Until now, we have focused exclusively on the semantic
characteristics of the expression 'I' rather than on the
subject who uses these indexicals. No attempts have been
made to explain why such failure of substitution occurs.
But Evans singles out what is distinctive about 'I' to be a
property of the speaker and what she knows. This is a
significant departure from the views discussed in Chapter
Two. Though there is little textual evidence in Frege that
supports this epistemological point about self-
identification, in the end Evans's proposal is consistent
with what Frege explicitly says about the thoughts expressed
by first-person indexical sentences, that "... only Dr.
Lauben himself can grasp thoughts determined in this way."
Some philosophers have thought it problematic to
interpret Frege's comments about 'I' in this way. For
example, John Perry offers this complaint:
Nothing could be more out of the spirit
of Frege's account of sense and thought
than an incommunicable, private
thought . 20
Perry argues that Frege could not have been committed to
'I '-thoughts only one person can grasp because the notion of
a private and incommunicable sense for 'I' is itself
problematic. Perry reasons as follows:
Suppose M is the private, incommunicable sense for 'I'
that Beth Dixon associates with this word. For there to be
such a sense I, Beth Dixon, must be aware of a way in which
I am presented to myself and to no one else. And, since
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senses are inodes of presentation that uniquely determine a
referent, M must determine a concept that only I fall under.
It is this second requirement that Perry finds difficult to
satisfy. For example, it might be that only I am aware of
myself under the aspect 'person with a sore throat' because
I haven't yet told anyone my throat is sore. Here M will be
the primitive sense corresponding to this aspect of myself
that is private to me. It does not follow, Perry argues,
that M will determine a unique concept that only Beth Dixon
falls under. If 'the person with the sore throat' is the
sense of 'I' as Beth Dixon uses it, this sense will not
uniquely determine Beth Dixon as referent; it is quite
likely there are any number of people that this description
will be true of at the time when I use it. In general,
Perry does not think there are aspects of me only I am
aware of having, and that will also determine a unique
concept that only I fall under. Since these conditions must
be satisfied if M is to be a sense that presents a unique
thing as the referent of 'I', there are no private,
incommunicable senses for 'I '. 21
In trying to specify the sense, M, for 'I', Perry
assumes that M is a definite description of the referent of
'I' in a particular context. The following passage is
evidence of this assumption.
How can we extract from a demonstrative
an appropriate completing sense? Such a
sense, it seems, would have to be
intimately related to the sense of a
unique description of the value of the
demonstrative in the context of
92
utterance. But where does such a
description come from? 22
But Evans explicitly rejects Perry's assumption that
the sense of 'I' must be a definite description that
uniquely determines a referent. As we have already seen,
Evans interprets Frege's notion of sense to be a way of
thinking of a referent that cannot be grasped independently
of this referent. And, according to Evans, when a subject
uses 'I' to report a thought, she needn't be thinking of
herself by means of some descriptive concept . 23 That Perry
is unable to find a definite description that uniquely
refers to the speaker of 'I' fails to show there is no
private and incommunicable sense for 'I'.
' I
'
Thoughts
In this section I show how Evans's interpretation of
Frege leads him to say that Fregean ' I ' -thoughts can be
entertained only by the speaker of a first-person indexical
sentence that expresses that thought.
Recall Frege's claim that "everyone is presented to
himself in a particular and primitive way, in which he is
presented to no one else." 2 ^ Depending on the scope of the
quantifier word 'everyone', Frege's comments may mean
either:
(a) There is a particular and primitive
way of thinking of oneself such that
every person thinks of herself in
exactly this way; or
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(b) For every person, there is a
particular and primitive way in which
she thinks of herself . 25
Reading (a) implies a way of thinking of oneself that is the
same for different people. Reading (b) implies that every
person thinks of herself in a different way.
The difference between the readings in (a) and (b) may
reflect a difference between two different conceptions of
sense. Reading (a) correctly characterizes the sense of 'I'
if we regard senses as the conventional significance of an
expression or its linguistic meaning that remains constant
on every occasion of use. The linguistic meaning of 'I' may
be what every native speaker grasps in using 'I'.
Or, if the sense of 'I' is construed as a mode of
presentation of its referent, then reading (b) correctly
describes the relation between senses and their referents.
If the sense of 'I' is a mode of presentation of a referent
on a particular occasion, then as the referent varies, so
must the sense of 'I', since the sense must uniquely pick
out a referent on a particular occasion of use. 'I' as used
by different speakers cannot have the same sense on
different occasions of use, so the sense must change
relative to each speaker. Reading (b) is consistent with
this consequence, since (b) implies that for every speaker
who uses 'I', there is a different sense for 'I'.
Evans characterizes the sense of ' I ' according to
reading (b)
.
According to Evans's proposal, when Hume
states 'I am hot', the thought Hume entertains will consist
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of the sense of the predicate expression ' ( £>t) is hot' and
the sense of 'I' as spoken by Hume. When Hume grasps the
sense of 'I' he thinks of himself in the particular way that
can be represented by Hume standing in relation to
himself. The thought Hume expresses when he reports 'I am
hot' is represented by Evans as the ordered pair:
(1) < Ax(R 1 (x,Hume) ) , sense of '(pc) is
hot ' >
.
26
When Heimson reports 'I am hot', Heimson stands in the
relation R1 to himself, but the entire thought Heimson
expresses by an utterance of 'I am hot' is represented as:
(2) < A xfR 1 (x, Heimson) ) , sense of ' (oC)
is hot'>.^ 7
Both Heimson and Hume think of themselves in the same
way by standing in relation R^ to themselves. But, Evans
explains, we cannot give the same account of what makes each
person's thought have the object it does, e.g., Hume's
thought about Hume, and Heimson 's thought about Heimson.
Evans insists the sense of 'I' is not to be identified with
the relation type, R lf by itself, but this relation together
with the first member of the thought— in the case of (1),
the individual, Hume. A person x grasps the sense of 'I'
when Hume utters 'I am hot' if and only if x satisfies the
relational property (R^ (x, Hume) ) . 28 Since only Hume
satisfies the relational property \x(R ± (x, Hume) ) , only Hume
can grasp the sense of ' I ' in the context where Hume utters
•I am hot'. In general, only the speaker of 'I' in a
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particular context can grasp the sense of 'I' by standing in
the R-l relation to herself.
By identifying the sense of
' I * with the relation
and the referent of 'I' in a particular context, Evans is
committed to reading (b) above. The sense of 'I', which is
a constituent of Heimson's thought when he utters 'I am
hot', is X x (Ri (x, Heimson) ) . And when Hume utters 'I am
hot' the sense of 'I' on this occasion of use, which is a
constituent of Hume's thought, is X x (R x (x, Hume) ) . Thus,
according to Evans, every person thinks of herself in a
different way. At least, the senses of 'I' are different as
this word is used by different people.
Evans's analysis of first-person indexical sentences
implies only one person can entertain the thoughts expressed
by these sentences. Only Hume can entertain the thought in
(1) because only Hume satisfies the relational property
/\x(R 1 (x,Hume) ) by being identical to Hume. And, only
Heimson can entertain the thought in (2) because only
Heimson satisfies X x (R^ (x, Heimson) ) by being identical to
Heimson. Perhaps Heimson can know that Hume is hot, but not
by entertaining the very same thought Hume entertains when
he entertains (1). Heimson's thought that Hume is hot will
not contain R^ as a constituent, since this is the relation
of self-identification that represents the way in which
each person thinks about himself. Heimson must make use of
a relation other than R^ to express the thought that Hume is
hot. Hence, Heimson's thought that Hume is hot will be
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different from the thought Hume expresses in (1). Since
only Hume stands in the relation R-^ to Hume, only Hume can
entertain the thought that contains as constituents the
individual Hume and the relation R^.
Two Analyses of Belief
At one point Evans describes the analysis of indexical
belief John Perry advances in "Frege on Demonstratives" 29 as
a "notational variant" of his own. This comment is
puzzling. Evans's interpretation of Frege entails there are
'I' thoughts that only the speaker can grasp, yet Perry is
unsympathetic to this interpretation. In this section I
explain how Evans's analysis of indexical belief differs
from Perry's.
Consider the following passage where Evans compares
Perry's account to his own:
Perry uses locutions like "By
entertaining the sense of 'I', S
apprehended the thought consisting of
Hume and the sense of ' (^) is hot"', and
so perhaps he has in mind some such
construction as:
[3] S apprehends-in way-w <x, Sense
of ' (oc) is F'>
But surely this is now a notational
variant of Frege's approach, at best.
Where Frege would write:
[4] S believes <x, w, Sense of ' (p^)
is F ' >
Perry will write:
[5] S believes-in-way-w <x, Sense
of ' (X) is F'>
or "S believes, by apprehending such and
such a sense, the thought consisting of
x and the sense of ' (oC) is hot'."
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Suppose Hume reports 'I am hot', and 'S' in (4) and (5)
refers to Hume. For Evans, 'w' in (4) stands for the
relation of self-identification. The sense of 'I' is the
combination of Rx and the referent of 'I' in a particular
context. We earlier represented the sense of 'I' as the
relational property X x (Rx (x , Hume) ) , which is a
constituent of the thought Hume expresses by ' I am hot'.
Since only Hume can grasp the sense of 'I' by satisfying
this relational property, only Hume can entertain the
thought that includes this sense as a constituent. This is
the sense in which Fregean 'I '-thoughts are inaccessible to
all but the agents of first-person indexical sentences.
For Perry, ' believing-in-way-w
' ,
as it occurs in (5),
represents, for example, Hume's entertaining the linguistic
meaning or 'role' of the indexical expression 'I'. From
what Perry says about the role of a demonstrative, we can
infer that different people grasp the same role for 'I' on
different occasions of use. 31 Perry says:
When we understand a word like 'today,'
what we seem to know is a rule taking us
from an occasion of utterance to a
certain object. 'Today' takes us to the
very day of utterance, 'yesterday' to
the day before the utterance, 'I' to the
speaker, and so forth. I shall call
this the role of the demonstrative. 32
Perry's analysis in (5) does not entail inaccessible
Fregean thoughts. There is nothing intrinsic to the
consitituents of Hume's thought in (5), neither Hume, nor
the sense of ' (oC) is hot', that prevents these objects from
being the constituents of thoughts expressed by someone
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other than Hume. For example, if Heimson utters 'That man
is hot* while pointing to Hume, the thought expressed by
this utterance contains as constituents Hume and the sense
of ' (</*) is hot'. in this case, both Heimsen and Hume utter
sentences that express thoughts containing the same
constituents.
So, one difference between Evans's representation in
(4) and the representation Evans attributes to Perry in (5),
is the way ' I ' -thoughts are individuated. Evans's
interpretation of Fregean 'I' -thoughts entails that these
thoughts can be entertained only by the speaker of a first-
person indexical sentence, while Perry's way of
individuating ' I ' -thoughts preserves the sharability of
these thoughts, insofar as more than one person can
entertain the thought expressed by a first-person indexical
sentence
.
Nevertheless, Evans's comparison of the analyses in (4)
and (5) suggests the following rejoinder. On Perry's
analysis in (5)
,
it does not make sense to refer to the
thought S believes, per se, but only the thought S
'believes-in-way-w' . If Hume reports 'I am hot', then the
correct description of this belief is that Hume believeswl
(believes-in-way-jJ the thought containing Hume and the sense
of '(<*<) is hot' by entertaining the meaning or role of 'I'
in the context where Hume is the speaker. But if Heimson
reports 'That man is hot' while pointing to Hume, then
Heimson believesw2 the thought containing as constituents
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Hunte and the sense of • (<*) is hot', by entertaining the
role or meaning of the demonstrative 'that man'. While the
propositional objects of Hume's beliefwl and Heimson's
beliefw2 are the same, they do not share the same belief-in-
wayn . only Hume can believewl the thought containing as a
constituent the individual Hume, since only Hume can use the
indexical 'I' to refer to himself. While Perry's analysis
in (5) does not commit him to Fregean thoughts that only one
person can apprehend, we might think it commits him to
inaccessible beliefs" beliefs that only one person can
believe. In general, on Perry's account it will be true
that only the speaker of an indexical sentence 'I am F' can
believe-in-way-L the Fregean thought containing the speaker
herself, and the sense of ' (<k) is F'.
Still, it is not clear anything worse follows from the
fact that, for example, only Hume can believe-in-way-L
,
the
thought containing Hume and the sense of ' (c/.) is hot'. The
representation in (5) implies that Hume's self-attributed
belief is a three-place relation between Hume, a way of
believing a thought, and the thought expressed by the
indexical sentence 'I am hot' uttered by Hume. From this
proposal for analyzing belief attributions, it is not clear
what components of this relation individuate Hume's belief.
At times. Perry suggests that beliefs might be either
identified with the sense entertained by the believer (the
role of a demonstrative)
,
or the thought (proposition)
apprehended by the believer. For example, Perry says:
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Why should we care how someone
apprehends a thought, so long as he
does? I can only sketch the barest
suggestion of an answer here. We use
senses to individuate psychological
states, in explaining and predicting
action. It is the sense entertained,
and not the thought apprehended, that is
tied to human action. When you and I
entertain the sense of "A bear is about
to attack me," we behave similarly. We
both roll up in a ball and try to be as
still as possible. Different thoughts
apprehended, same sense entertained,
same behavior. When you and I both
apprehend the thought that I am about to
be attacked by a bear, we behave
differently. I roll up in a ball, you
run to get help. Same thought
apprehended, different sense
entertained, different behavior. 33
If we use senses, or the role of a demonstrative, to
individuate psychological states in the way Perry describes,
then there is a straightforward sense in which Hume's belief
is accessible to other people. When both Heimson and Hume
utter 'I am hot' they believe the same thing, since they
each entertain the same sense or role of the indexical 'I'
on different occasions of use.
Perry also indicates there are times when we want to
correctly identify what is believed. In these cases we
identify the belief with a Fregean thought (as Perry defines
these)
,
rather than the role of a demonstrative in a
context. He says:
Suppose Mary utters (7) [I believe that
Russia and Canada quarrelled today.] on
August 1, and I want to report the next
day on what she believed. If I want to
report the sense entertained, I should
use (8) [Mary believed that Russia and
Canada quarrelled today.] But this
gives the wrong result. Clearly I would
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use (9) [Mary believed that Russia and
Canada quarrelled yesterday.] 34
Perry suggests in this passage that Hume's belief is the
thought containing Hume and the sense of ' (p<j is hot'. in
other words, to specify what Hume believes we need only make
reference to this thought, regardless of the way in which
the thought is entertained. In this case, the thought
expressed by Hume's utterance of ' I am hot' can be an object
of belief for individuals other than Hume. Unless it can be
shown that individuating beliefs in this way is
inappropriate, it appears Perry's analysis of belief in (5)
does not entail inaccessible beliefs in any way that is
objectionable. 35
Evans cannot so easily avoid inaccessible beliefs.
Evans's analysis of self-attribution in (4) is a two-place
relation, where what Hume believes is identified with the
Fregean thought < A x(R 1 (x,Hume) ) , sense of ' (o4
)
is hot'>.
On this account, there are no other ways of individuating
beliefs than by the Fregean thoughts expressed by indexical
sentences embedded behind 'believes that' contexts. Since
these thoughts can be entertained by only one person,
Evans's analysis of self-attribution entails beliefs that
can be entertained by only one person.
Evans's analysis of self-attribution has certain
advantages. It preserves the two-place belief relation
without resorting to individual essences or propositional
guises. But many of the objections raised against first-
person propositions in Chapter Two also apply to Evans's
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interpretation of Fregean
'
I
'
-thoughts
. Specifically,
Fregean 'I' thoughts may be construed also as the meanings
of sentences in which case the meanings of indexical
sentences containing
* I * are not sharable. This result
violates our intuitions about the inherently public
character of linguistic meaning necessary for explaining
communication between language users. in addition, there
are also disadvantages to individuating self-attributed
beliefs in such a way that no more than one person can have
that belief. This consequence also conflicts with our
intuition that the thought content expressed by an utterance
can be shared by more than one person.
Simply put, Evans's analysis of ' I ' -thoughts avoids
the difficulties associated with Castaneda's guise theory
and Chisholm's individual essences, but it falls prey to the
same problems created by the inaccessibility and privacy of
first-person propositions. Because Evans's analysis of
self-attribution forces us to diverge from the traditional
characterization of linguistic meaning and a common-sense
understanding of the attribution of belief and other
psychological states, I recommend that we continue to
explore other ways of analyzing self-attributed belief.
Perry's three-place relation of belief is a good candidate,
since it does not appear to entail inaccessible linguistic
meanings or belief content. In the next chapter I examine
Perry's analysis of self-attribution and the role it plays
in a puzzle about indexical belief.
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CHAPTER 6
BELIEF STATES
Introduction
In this chapter I examine John Perry's solution to a
puzzle about indexical belief. Perry's formulation of the
messy shopper puzzle and his subsequent solution are worth
considering for the following reasons. First, Perry's
reasoning is characteristic of the arguments for first-
person propositions advanced by Kretzmann and Grim in
Chapter Two. But Perry argues that the traditional theory
of propositions is not an adequate solution to the puzzle
he describes, and offers in its place an alternative theory
of belief. If Perry's alternative is viable, then it is
possible to avoid the difficulties created by private
linguistic meaning and belief content. In this chapter I
argue that Perry has not formulated an adequate
individuation principle for belief states, though these
states play a central role in his solution to the messy
shopper.
The Messv Shopper
In "The Problem of the Essential Indexical" 1 Perry
describes the following example:
I once followed a trail of sugar on a
supermarket floor, pushing my cart down
the aisle on one side of a tall counter
and back the aisle on the other, seeking
the shopper with the torn sack to tell
him he was making a mess. With each
trip around the counter the trail became
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thicker. But I seemed unable to catch
up. Finally it dawned on me. I was the
shopper I was trying to catch. 2
According to Perry this example creates a puzzle about
indexical belief. The puzzle is to explain what the subject
in this example comes to believe when she stops to
straighten her cart. For discussion assume that I, Beth
Dixon, am the shopper described. At the outset (time t
x )
,
I
believe that:
(1) The shopper with the torn sack is
making a mess.
But I do not believe what I would express by:
(2) I am making a mess.
It is only later (at t 2 ) that I come to believe (2)
,
and at
this time I stop to straighten the torn sack of sugar in my
own cart. To explain the change in my behavior at t 2
requires attributing to me a change in my beliefs at this
time. Accordingly, any solution to the puzzle must explain
what new belief I come to have when I am finally prepared to
utter (2)
.
Perry's initial proposal is to analyze belief
attributions as two-place relations between a believer and a
proposition. At time t^ I express my belief by the
following sentence:
(3) I believe that the shopper with the
torn sack is making a mess.
According to Perry's initial proposal, sentence (3) may be
analyzed as the relation of belief that holds between the
referent of 'I' in (3), Beth Dixon, and the proposition
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expressed by the embedded clause in (3)— 'the shopper with
the torn sack is making a mess'. At time t 2 I express my
belief by the sentence:
(4) I believe that I am making a mess.
Similarly, sentence (4) may be analyzed as the relation of
belief between myself and the proposition expressed by ' I am
making a mess' as this clause occurs in (4).
The solution to the puzzle of the messy shopper seems
to require, in part, specifying the proposition expressed by
'I am making a mess' in (4) in order to characterize what I
believe at this time. But as Perry and others have noted,
this condition is not easily met. 3
Consider the following sentence uttered by me:
(5) I believe that Beth Dixon is making
a mess.
It is possible that (5) is true even though (4) is false, if
I believe that a person named 'Beth Dixon' is the messy
shopper on the basis of a store announcement, but fail to
believe that I am the person referred to by that name.
Perhaps I am suffering from amnesia.
In general, for any name or description, 'T', that does
not contain an indexical designation and refers to Beth
Dixon, it is possible for (4) and (6) to differ in truth-
value, where both sentences are uttered by me.
(4) I believe that I am making a mess.
(6) I believe that T is making a mess.
Perry refers to the embedded occurrence of 'I' in (4) as an
"essential indexical" because it cannot be eliminated for
109
any non indexical name or description of Beth Dixon salva
veritate Perry interprets the difficulty in specifying
the proposition I believe in (4) as evidence that there is
no proposition I believe in (4). But this point requires
further support. We might suppose that while there is no
description that can be substituted salva veritate for 'I'
in (4), what I believe can be specified by reference to a
singular proposition containing the individual Beth Dixon as
a constituent. Perhaps when I come to believe that I am
making a mess at time t 2/ I come to believe the de re
proposition that consists of the ordered pair <dixon,
making a mess>
.
The difficulty with such a proposal, Perry argues, is
that I may believe the singular proposition <dixon, making a
mess> but fail to believe that I am making a mess. Suppose
I am following the trail of sugar down one aisle and up the
next, still searching for the messy shopper. Suddenly I see
the figure of the messy shopper in a mirror at the end of
the aisle, but fail to recognize this as a reflection of
myself. I exclaim, "She is making a mess," while pointing
to the figure in the mirror. Since I demonstrate myself,
'she' refers to me in the context of utterance, despite my
failure of recognition. At this time I have a de re belief
in the singular proposition containing Beth Dixon as a
constituent. But now it appears that my belief in the
singular proposition <dixon, making a mess > does not explain
my change of belief at time t 2 since it is possible for me
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to believe this very proposition, but fail to believe I am
making a mess. The evidence for this is my failure to
engage in any cart-straightening behavior at the time when I
am disposed to utter 'She is making a mess'. According to
Perry, the messy shopper puzzle is not solved by appealing
to singular propositions as the objects of belief.
Perry's Solution
rejects the two—place belief relation between a
believer and a proposition, and offers in its place a three-
place belief relation between a believer, a Russellian
singular proposition—where this proposition is an ordered
pair containing an individual and a property—and what Perry
calls a 'belief state'. On this alternative account, the
'object' of belief is the singular proposition expressed by
an embedded clause containing a singular term. For example,
suppose it is true that:
(4) I believe that I am making a mess.
Then the object of my belief is just the singular
proposition consisting of the ordered pair, Beth Dixon and
the property making a mess . But the picture is further
complicated by Perry's introduction of "ways of believing"
these singular propositions. Different ways of believing
propositions correspond to different belief states, which
are individuated by the indexical sentences a believer is
disposed to utter.
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Consider all those shoppers in grocery stores who are
disposed to utter the sentence 'I am making a mess'. Perry
says
:
The shoppers
. . . are all in a certain
belief state, a state which, given
normal desires and other belief states
they can expect to be in, will lead each
of them to examine his cart. But,
although they are all in the same belief
state (not the total belief state, of
course)
,
they do not all have the same
belief (believe the same thing, have the
relation of belief to the same
object)
.
5
Recall Perry's original description of the messy
shopper. At first it is true that:
(3) I believe that the shopper with the
torn sack is making a mess (in the
context where Beth Dixon is the agent)
.
Later, it is true that:
(4) I believe that I am making a mess
(in the context where Beth Dixon is the
agent)
.
What new belief do I acquire at this later time that will
explain the change in ray behavior? To answer this question
Perry depends on a principle about analyzing belief
attributions of the form displayed by (3) and (4)
.
He
endorses the following Belief Principle:
(BP) I believe that s'1 is analyzed as
Ba ,p/0—where a is the individual
denoted by *1' on a particular occasion
of use, and P is a's belief state
individuated by the sentence 'S' that a
is disposed to utter, and is the
singular proposition expressed by 'S'
where 'S' contains a singular term
denoting a.
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According to (BP)
,
my belief expressed by ( 3 ) can be
represented as:
( 3 *) B dixon, 'The shopper with the torn
sack is making a mess', < dixon, M >•
And, my belief expressed by (4) can be represented as:
(4*) B dixon, 'I am making a mess',
< dixon, M >•
The representations in (3*) and (4*) reveal that I am in a
different belief state at the later time because I am
disposed to utter the indexical sentence, 'I am making a
mess'. Though my belief state changes, the object of my
belief—the singular proposition which is the third term of
the belief relation—remains the same. Hence, on Perry's
solution, it is the change in my belief state at the later
time that explains my change of belief, and why I stop to
straighten my cart.
The Individuation of Belief States
According to Perry's solution, appealing to the
singular proposition <dixon, making a mess > as the object of
my belief is insufficient for explaining why I stop to
straighten my cart, since I have this proposition as the
object of my belief even at t-^, when I am still following
the trail of sugar "down one aisle and up the next." Belief
states are playing the crucial explanatory role in the
solution Perry offers because the change in my belief is
explained by a change in my belief state at t 2 « Therefore,
it is useful to clarify what Perry means by a belief state
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and how these states contribute to explanations of
behavior. Perry says:
We use sentences with indexicals or
relativized propositions to individuate
belief states, for the purposes of
classifying believers in ways useful for
explanation and prediction
. . . We
expect all good hearted people in that
state which leads them to say "I am
making a mess" to examine their grocery
carts, no matter what belief they have
in virtue of being in that state. That
we individuate belief states in this way
doubtless has something to do with the
fact that one criterion for being in the
states we postulate, at least for
articulate sincere adults, is being
disposed to utter the indexical sentence
in question . 6
Perry proposes that we can use indexical sentences as a
criterion for individuating the belief states of
individuals, and belief states then may be used in a
psychologically interesting way to explain and predict the
behavior of individuals. There is at least one major
obstacle to Perry's proposal—Perry does not formulate an
adequate individuation principle for belief states. Though
I make various attempts to revise Perry's initial proposal,
these revisions are also problematic. Because there is a
real difficulty in characterizing the notion of a belief
state, I argue we cannot use belief states to explain
behavior in the way Perry describes.
According to the passage quoted above, I (the messy
shopper) am in the appropriate belief state that leads to
cart-straightening behavior because I am disposed to utter
the indexical sentence 'I am making a mess'. And, anyone
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who is disposed to utter the indexical sentence in question
will be in this same belief state. The following principle
likely captures Perry's recommendations for individuating
Belief States:
(BS) For any individuals x and y, x and
y are in the same belief state if and
only if x and y are disposed to utter
the same sentences.
The problem with principle (BS) is that it individuates
belief states too finely to play the explanatory role Perry
describes. Consider Pierre, who finds himself in a
remarkably similar predicament. Pierre initially follows a
trail of sugar down one aisle of a Parisian market and up
the next, trying to catch up with the messy shopper.
Eventually Pierre realizes that the messy shopper is
himself, and stops to straighten the torn sack of sugar in
his cart. But, when Pierre stops to straighten his cart, he
does not utter the indexical sentence 'I am making a mess'.
Nor does Pierre have a disposition to utter this sentence,
for he speaks no English whatsoever. Hence, according to
Perry's recommendation for individuating belief states (BS)
,
Pierre is not in the same belief state that I am in. More
generally, only English speakers can be in the appropriate
belief state leading to cart-straightening behavior. If
only English speakers can be in the relevant belief state,
then belief states seem unsuitable for the task Perry
describes. Recall Perry's comment that belief states allow
us to classify believers in ways useful for the explanation
and prediction of behavior. There is every reason to think
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Perry would want to say that Beth Dixon and Pierre act
similarly because they are in the same belief state. What
is needed is an alternative way of individuating these
states that will have the result that Pierre and I believe
alike
.
One possibility is to appeal to the linguistic meaning
of the sentences we are disposed to utter. Although Pierre
may not be disposed to utter the English sentence 'I am
making a mess', he may be disposed to utter a French
translation of this sentence that means the same thing.
There is evidence that Perry accepts the account of sentence
meaning proposed by David Kaplan in the manuscript
Demonstratives
.
7 In a footnote to "The Problem of the
Essential Indexical," Perry says about his own solution to
the messy shopper:
This two-tiered structure of belief
states and propositions believed will
remind the reader familiar with David
Kaplan's r Demonstratives 1 8 of his system
of characters and contents. This is no
accident, for my approach to the problem
of the essential indexical was formed by
using the distinction as found in
earlier versions of Kaplan's work to try
and find a solution to the problem as
articulated by Castaneda. 9
In the next section I examine Kaplan's distinction between
character and content in order to formulate an appropriate
revision to (BS)
.
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Character and Content
Kaplan distinguishes two kinds of meaning that apply to
sentences in a context, or
. . any meaningful part of
speech taken in a context ,
^
where context is an ordered 4-
tuple consisting of a world, time, place, and agent. For
Kaplan, indexicals as well as all other singular terms are
directly referential. This means they refer directly to
individuals without mediation by some Fregean sense or
concept. The propositions expressed by sentences containing
such singular terms will be singular propositions containing
individuals as constituents. The content of an indexical
expression will be the individual referred to in a
particular context. And, likewise, we can determine the
content of an indexical sentence such as ' I am tired' by
taking this sentence together with the context of
utterance. In the case where Beth Dixon is the agent, and
the rest of the contextual features are specified, the
content of this sentence will be the singular proposition
consisting of the ordered pair, the individual Beth Dixon
and the property being tired . or <dixon, being tired>. We
may want to evaluate the truth or falsity of that sentence
in different possible worlds and times, given the content it
has in the actual world where Beth Dixon is the agent. In
this case the content of this sentence in a context can be
represented by a content function that takes possible worlds
and times as arguments, and yields a truth-value as value.
The value will be true in just those worlds and times where
117
Beth Dixon is tired. Similarly, the content of any
expression in a context can be represented as that function
from circumstances of evaluation (world-time pairs) to the
appropriate extension, either individuals, sets of n-tuples,
or truth-values.
The second kind of meaning Kaplan distinguishes is
character. Character is what determines the content of an
expression or sentence in varying contexts. The character
of an expression in a context can also be represented by a
function—a function from a particular context to content.
For example, the character of the indexical expression 'I'
in the context where Beth Dixon is the agent, can be
represented by that function that takes the context of
utterance as argument and yields a content as value, where
the content of this expression is represented as that
function from circumstances of evaluation to the appropriate
extension— in this case, the individual Beth Dixon. Kaplan
sometimes speaks of the character of expressions and
sentences in an abbreviated way, as functions from contexts
to extensions . 11 So we might think of the character of the
indexical expression 'I', as that function that takes
possible contexts as arguments and yields the speaker of
that context as value. Similarly, we might represent the
character of the indexical sentence 'I am making a mess' as
that function that takes possible contexts as arguments, and
yields as value a unique proposition. The character
function for indexical sentences and expressions is
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sensitive to context, since the content of that sentence or
expression will change relative to the agent of the context
in which the sentence occurs.
We are now in a better position to specify the sense in
whi-C-h Pierre and I believe alike. Pierre and 1 have the
same beliefs because we are both disposed to utter a
sentence with the same character. The character function in
question can be described in the following way:
(A) That function that takes any
context, c, as argument and yields as
value a function from worlds and times
to truth-values, such that given a
particular world and time, the value is
true if and only if the speaker or
writer of c is making a mess in that
world and time.
We might formulate a revised individuation principle
for belief states in the following way:
(BS2 ) For any individuals x and y, x and
y are in the same belief state if and
only if x and y are disposed to utter
sentences with the same character.
Though I am disposed to utter the indexical sentence 'I am
making a mess', and Pierre is disposed to utter the French
sentence 'Je fais un gachis', we are both in the same belief
state because the sentences we are disposed to utter have
the character described in (A)
.
Though we can use the
character function described in (A) as a way of
individuating belief states, it is not yet apparent how
being in a particular belief state individuated by
character contributes to explanations and predictions of
behavior.
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The Cognitive Significance of Character
Kaplan indicates that the cognitive significance of
character is intimately linked to the role that character
plays in explanations of behavior. For example, in the
following paragraph Kaplan quotes from Perry's article
"Frege on Demonstratives," 12 substituting his own
terminology for Perry's:
Why should we care under what character
someone apprehends a thought, so long as
he does? I can only sketch the barest
suggestion of an answer here. we use
the manner of presentation, the
character, to individuate psychological
states, in explaining and predicting
action. It is the manner of
presentation, the character, and not the
thought apprehended, that is tied to
human action. When you and I have
beliefs under the common character of 'A
bear is about to attack me', we behave
similarly. We both roll up in a ball
and try to be as still as possible.
Different thoughts apprehended, same
character, same behavior. When you and
I both apprehend that I am about to be
attacked by a bear, we behave
differently. I roll up in a ball, you
run to get help. Same thought
apprehended, different characters,
different behaviors. 13
If we want to use belief states to explain and predict
behavior, as both Perry and Kaplan recommend, then we cannot
individuate belief states according to ( BS2 ) . Consider the
case where I unknowingly spill sugar from my cart in an
aisle of the grocery store. Suppose that I utter the
sentence 'Je fais un gachis' because I am pretending to be
French and recently overheard this phrase uttered by a
French speaker. Yet, I do not understand a word of the
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French language. In this case I utter a sentence that has
the character described in (A) but for the wrong reasons.
According to (BS2) Pierre and I are in the same belief
state, but being in this state does not lead to any cart-
straightening behavior on my part. Any plausible
individuation principle for belief states will individuate
these states in such a way that we can use these states to
specify sufficient conditions for certain kinds of behavior
on the part of sincere, articulate adults.
We might try revising ( BS2 ) to reguire that the
believer understand the character of whatever sentence she
utters or is disposed to utter. To reguire that I
understand the French sentence I utter in order to be in the
appropriate belief state is to require that I know the
linguistic conventions governing the use of that sentence.
Kaplan says:
The character of an expression is set by
linguistic conventions and, in turn,
determines the content of the expression
in every context. Because character is
what is set by linguistic conventions,
it is natural to think of it as meaning
in the sense of what is known by the
competent language user. 14
Our previous individuation principle for belief states can
be revised to avoid cases where an individual fails to be
cognizant of the linguistic conventions (i.e. character)
that governs her utterance.
(BS3) For any individuals x and y, x and
y are in the same belief state if and
only if x and y are disposed to utter
sentences with the same character, and x
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and y understand the character of the
sentences they are disposed to utter.
It is unrealistic to require that competent language
users be able to state the character function of the
sentences they utter or are disposed to utter, since native
speakers may be competent language users but not know what a
function is. Understanding the character of an expression
may be construed as the simple requirement that speakers be
cognizant of the meaning rules of the expressions they use.
For example, Kaplan describes the character of 'I' as the
meaning rule: 'I' refers to the speaker or writer of a
particular occurrence of that word. 15
When any good-hearted shopper finds herself disposed to
utter a sentence that has the character described in (A)
,
and the shopper understands that 'I' refers to the speaker
or writer of the sentence she is disposed to utter, then she
is in the belief state that leads to cart-straightening
behavior. Part of the explanation why the shopper
straightens her cart is that she understands the meaning
rule for 'I'—the expression that occurs in the sentence she
is disposed to utter.
Despite its initial plausibility, there are still a
whole range of cases that create problems for ( BS3 )
.
For
example, suppose that I am pushing my cart up one aisle and
down the next in a grocery store. I am approached by the
store manager, who offers me a large sum of money if I will
loudly utter the sentence 'I am making a mess'. It seems
the manager is under a great deal of pressure by the owner
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of the store to find the messy shopper. And, unable to do
so, he has settled on coercing an admission of guilt from an
innocent shopper. I accept the money and utter the sentence
'I am making a mess'. in doing so, I also understand the
meaning rules for * I ' and for the entire sentence I utter.
So, according to ( BS3 ) , I am in the same belief state that
leads Pierre and the original messy shopper to straighten
^-heir carts. Yet in this case I do not stop to straighten
my cart because I do not believe that I am the messy
shopper. It must be that either I am not in the same belief
state as these other shoppers, and ( BS3 ) does not yield an
acceptable individuation principle for belief states. Or,
being in a particular belief state is unrelated to the
subsequent behavior a person performs. Neither of these
options would be acceptable for Perry, so we might try to
revise ( BS3 ) to avoid this counter-example. It is not
obvious how to do so.
One possiblity is to include in (BS3 ) a sincerity
condition that puts believers in the same belief state if
and only if they are disposed to sincerely utter sentences
with the same character, and understand the character of
these sentences. Perry indicates something of the sort when
he says:
That we individuate belief states in
this way doubtless has something to do
with the fact that one criterion for
being in the states we postulate, at
least for articulate sincere adults . is
being disposed to utter the indexical
sentence in question. 16
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We are naturally inclined to say about the example just
raised, even though I utter the sentence 'I am making a
mess', I do not sincerely utter this sentence.
It is difficult to interpret 'sincerely' in this
context without making the individuation principle circular.
In the example described it seems my utterance is not
sincere because I do not mean what I say. In other words,
even though I utter 'I am making a mess', I do not believe
that I am making a mess because I have other reasons for
producing this utterance, i.e., greed. In effect, the
recommendation for revising ( BS3 ) is the following:
(BS4) For any individuals x and y, x and
y are in the same belief state if and
only if x and y are disposed to utter
sentences with the same character; and x
and y understand the character of the
sentences they are disposed to utter;
and x and y believe what is expressed by
the sentences they are disposed to
utter.
According to (BS4)
,
any two people are in the belief
state that leads to cart-straightening behavior if and only
if they utter 'I am making a mess', understand the character
of this sentence, and believe what they say. But this
proposal is circular. It will not help to individuate
psychological states by the beliefs a person has, since
those beliefs are what we are trying to characterize by
formulating an individuation principle to begin with.
Moreover, this counter-example is not an isolated case.
There are any number of inappropriate reasons for being
disposed to utter sentences, including various types of
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coercion (such as torture or blackmail), desiring to impress
a friend, wanting to take the blame, duplicity, to name a
few. These reasons are too varied and numerous to exclude
all such cases by a ceteris paribus clause attached to
(BS3)
. I suspect all inappropriate reasons for being
disposed to utter a sentence are inappropriate because the
believer is, in some sense, insincere about what she
asserts. But I see no way of explaining insincerity other
than by saying the believer fails to believe what she is
disposed to utter. Including a condition that individuals
actually believe what they are disposed to utter in any
individuation principle for belief states will create
circularity in that principle of the sort displayed by
(BS4)
. Perhaps an adequate individuation principle for
belief states can be formulated, but Perry has not done so.
And, despite my efforts to make ( BS3 ) plausible, it is not
obvious how to circumvent counter-examples involving
coercion and other inappropriate reasons for being disposed
to utter sentences. 17
By Perry's own account it is belief states that play a
psychological role in explanations of behavior. At time t 2
my belief state changes since, at this time, I am disposed
to utter a sentence with a different character. If my
belief is identified with my belief state, then there is a
sense in which my belief changes at time t2 . The change in
my belief state will explain my subsequent change of
behavior at time t 2 . The difficulty with Perry's solution
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is that he requires the notion of a belief state to explain
the puzzle of the messy shopper. Yet we have just seen that
Perry has not formulated a plausible individuation principle
for belief states, nor is it obvious how to do so. This is
not a devasting criticism of Perry, but it indicates that
Perry's proposal for analyzing indexical belief leaves much
to be explained. Perry himself seems to acknowledge this
when he says about the individuation of belief states: "A
good philosophy of mind should explain this in detail; my
aim is merely to get clear about what it is that needs
explaining ." 18 Until "a good philosophy of mind" has
explained the notion of a belief state, Perry is better off
relinquishing his attempt to use belief states in a general
psychological theory of behavior. Perry does not say enough
about how to characterize these states, given the important
role he assigns them in his analysis of self-attribution.
Though Perry's analysis of belief does not leave us
with a plausible psychology of behavior, it has an advantage
over the two-place relations of belief. Perry's proposal
does not entail private linguistic meanings. His three-
place relation of belief allows us to say that the meanings
of indexical sentences are singular propositions, which are
publicly accessible entities. In this way, the semantics of
belief attributions is distinguished from the psychology of
belief. This is a promising strategy for avoiding the
privileged access of two-place relations of belief discussed
in Chapters Two-Five.
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CHAPTER 7
SELF-ATTRIBUTED PROPERTIES
Introduction
In this chapter I examine the theories of self-
attribution advanced by Roderick Chisholm in The First
Person
,
1 and David Lewis in "Attitudes De Dicto and De Se. 1,2
Both Chisholm and Lewis analyze de se belief as a two-place
relation between a believer and a property. I argue that
privileged access is not entailed by these property
theories, though there are other difficulties that arise for
each of the specific proposals discussed by Chisholm and
Lewis
.
Chisholm and Direct Attribution
One of Chisholm's projects in The First Person is to
show that belief about oneself—what Lewis calls "de se "
belief—cannot be reduced to, either de dicto or de re
belief. To this end Chisholm introduces the following
example taken from Mach's Analysis of Sensations . 3
Not long ago, after a trying railway
journey by night, and much fatigued, I
got into an omnibus, just as another
gentleman appeared at the other end.
"What shabby pedagogue is that, that has
just entered?" thought I. It was
myself; opposite me hung a large mirror.
The physiognomy of my class,
accordingly, was better known to me than
my own
.
4
Chisholm goes on to say about Mach's example:
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As Mach entered the bus, then, he
believed with respect to Mach—and
therefore with respect to himself—that
he was a shabby pedagogue, but he did
not believe himself to be a shabby
pedagogue. The experience might have
made him say: "That man is a shabby
pedagogue." But
—
prior to his discovery
of the mirror—it would not have led him
to say: "I am a shabby pedagogue.
Chisholm uses this example and others like it to
illustrate the logical relations that hold between certain
kinds of sentence constructions. In particular, he wishes
to distinguish the de dicto and de re locutions from the de
se locution. These are exhibited by the following
sentences
:
(P) The tallest man believes that the
tallest man is wise.
(Q) There is an x such that x is
identical with the tallest man and x is
believed by x to be wise.
(S) The tallest man believes that he
himself is wise.
Of interest here are the logical relations that hold between
belief de se exhibited by the 'he himself' locution in (S) ,
belief de re represented by (Q)
,
and belief de dicto
represented by (P)
.
Chisholm claims the following:
(a) S does not imply P;
(b) P does not imply S;
(c) S implies Q;
(d) Q does not imply S . 6
According to Chisholm, (S) does not imply (P) because
it is possible that the tallest man believes that he himself
is wise but fails to believe that the tallest man is wise,
if he does not know this fact about himself—that he is the
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tallest man. The implication from (P) to (S) can fail for
the very same reason. The claim that (Q) fails to imply (s)
seems the most problematic, according to Chisholm. This is
the case illustrated by Mach's shabby pedagogue example. In
this case it is true that Mach believes of the person he
sees in the mirror, that 1 that person is a shabby
pedagogue'. But since he doesn't recognize 'that person' as
himself, he cannot sincerely say 'I believe that I am a
shabby pedagogue'. Therefore, it is not true that Mach
believes that he himself is a shabby pedagogue.
In The First Person Chisholm analyzes belief as a two-
place relation between a believer and a property. Chisholm
wants to characterize this relation so that it accounts for
the logical relations between the sentence constructions
exhibited by (P)
, (Q) and (S) . Chisholm's project is to
take the de se form of belief as primary, and to define the
de re and de dicto forms of belief in terms of it.
Believing must be construed as a
relation between a believer and some
other thing; this much is essential to
any theory of belief. What kind of
thing, then? There are various
possibilities: sentences, propositions
or states of affairs, properties,
individual things. The simplest
conception, I suggest, is one which
construes believing as a relation
involving a believer and a property-a
property which he may be said to
attribute to himself. Then the various
senses of believing may be understood by
reference to this simple conception . 7
The notion of 'direct attribution' is central to
Chisholm's analysis of belief. It operates as an undefined
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primitive in Chisholm's conceptual scheme, but the following
P-*-'-^-^ <-'ipl®s are conditions for its user
(PI) For every x, every y and every z,if x directly attributes z to y, then xis identical with y. 8
(P2) For every x, every y and every z,if x direcly attributes z to y, then zis a property. 9
Chisholm goes on to offer a definition of 'x believes that
he himself is F' in terms of direct attribution:
(Dl) x believes that he himself is F
=Df. The property of being F is such
that x directly attributes it to x. 10
When I form a belief about an object other than myself,
I indirectly attribute a property to that object. This
comes about in the following way: In order to make you the
object of my belief, I must single you out in relation to
myself. I can do this by directly attributing a property to
myself that implies there is a certain identifying relation,
R, which is such that you are the thing to which I bear R.
For example, suppose I form the belief that you are wise.
In order to make you the object of my belief I must single
you out by means of some identifying relation—such a
relation might be 'talking with', or 'x is talking with y'.
The property that I directly attribute to myself is one such
that it entails there is just one thing to whom I am talking
and that thing is wise. When these conditions obtain, I
indirectly attribute to you the property of being wise.
Chisholm's definition of indirect attribution is as follows:
( D2 ) y is such that, as the thing that x
bears R to, x indirectly attributes to
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it the property of being F =Df. x bears
R to y and only to y; and x directly
attributes to x a property which entails
the property of bearing R to just one
thing and to a thing that is F. 11
According to Chisholm, we can abbreviate (D2) in the
following way:
(D3) y is such that x indirectly
attributes to it the property of being F
=Df. There is a relation R such that x
indirectly attributes to y, as the thing
to which x bears R, the property of
being F. 12
Chisholm goes on to say about indirect attribution that a
believer can specify a certain identifying relation that
singles out her object of belief as the thing to which she
bears this identifying relation. 13
When Mach sees himself in the mirror without
recognizing his own reflection and says, 'That man is a
shabby pedagogue', Mach attributes to himself the property
of being a shabby pedagogue, but he does so only by
indirectly attributing this property to himself. So,
according to (D2)
,
there is an identifying relation that
Mach bears only to himself
—
perhaps it is 'x perceives y at
the end of the bus'—and Mach directly attributes to himself
a property that entails there is only one person he sees at
the end of the bus, and this person is a shabby pedagogue.
When Mach finally realizes that he is seeing his own
reflection in a mirror, he is in a position to say ' I am a
shabby pedagogue'. We can then truthfully say of Mach that
he believes that he himself is a shabby pedagogue. We can
analyze Mach's belief according to Chisholm's definition
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(Dl)
. The property of being a shabby pedagogue is such that
Mach directly attributes this property to himself.
Now we are in a better position to see how well
Chisholm's notions of direct and indirect attribution
explain puzzles about self-attribution.
Perry's Puzzle
One way of testing the adequacy of Chisholm's property
theory of belief is to see how well it explains Perry's
puzzle of the messy shopper. Recall the facts of the
example. At t x it is true that:
(1) I believe that the shopper with the
torn sack is making a mess (uttered by
Beth Dixon)
.
At a later time I come to realize that I am the messy
shopper, and I stop to straighten the torn sack in my cart.
At t 2 it is true that:
(2) I believe that I am making a mess
(uttered by Beth Dixon)
.
What I come to believe at t 2 should explain my change in
behavior on any plausible theory of belief.
According to Chisholm's theory, the object of my belief
at and t2 is not a proposition. Instead, (1) and (2) are
analyzed as two-place relations between a believer and an
attributed property. On this construal the property
directly attributed is the content of the attribution, and
the thing to which the property is attributed is the object
of the attribution. 14 In sentences (1) and (2) the object
of my belief attribution remains the same, since I am the
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thing to which a property is attributed in both (1) and (2).
The difference between what I believe at and t 2 must,
therefore, be represented by the content of my belief, or
the property that I directly attribute to Beth Dixon.
At t^ it is not true that:
(3) Beth Dixon believes that she herself
is making a mess.
On the basis of this fact we cannot analyze (1) as a case of
Beth Dixon directly attributing to herself the property of
making a mess. For Chisholm, the correct analysis of (1)
involves specifying that Beth Dixon (B.D.) indirectly
attributes to herself the property of making a mess.
According to (D2) this is to say that:
(la) There is an identifying relation,
R, that B.D. bears to B.D. and only to
B.D., and B.D. directly attributes to
herself a property that entails the
property of bearing R to just one thing
and to a thing that is making a mess.
In this case it is possible that the identifying relation,
R, that B.D. bears to herself is something like, 'x is
following y's sugar trail'.
At t 2 , when B.D. believes that she herself is making a
mess, we can analyze (2) as:
(2a) B.D. directly attributes to herself
the property of making a mess.
The fact that B.D. stops to straighten her sack at the
later time is one that we ought to be able to explain by
appealing to a change in B.D.'s beliefs at t 2 . In
Chisholm's terminology, B.D.'s belief at t^ and t 2 is
specified by the content of her attribution at those times.
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At t lf the content of B.D.'s belief is the property she
directly attributes to herself—the property of following
exactly one person leaving a sugar trail, and the person
making a mess. But at t 2 , the content of B.D.'s belief is
the property she directly attributes to herself—the
property of making a mess. So it seems Chisholm's theory
does allow us to explain the change in my behavior by
appealing to the fact that I acquire a different belief at
t 2 , but only on the assumption that a difference in the
properties I directly attribute reflects a difference in my
belief.
Inaccessible Beliefs?
In Chapter Two, I described an "inaccessible belief" as
a belief that can be entertained by only one person.
According to the Basic Argument, when the object of belief
(in the traditional terminology) is a first-person
proposition, only the agent of a first-person indexical
sentence can entertain the belief identified with that
first-person proposition. Does Chisholm's analysis of self-
attribution also entail inaccessible beliefs? In this
section I consider whether Chisholm's property theory of
belief commits him to any kind of inaccessibility. I argue
that it does not.
Consider the following account that seems to suggest
inaccessibility does follow from Chisholm's analysis of
self-attribution. In order to explain the puzzle about the
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messy shopper we identified my belief at time t 2 with the
property I directly attribute
—
making a mess
. Another
individual may directly attribute this property to herself
if she also believes that she herself is making a mess.
But, according to Chisholm, no one but I can directly
attribute a property to myself. So, no one but I can form
the same belief that constitutes my belief when I directly
attribute the property making a mess . For example, consider
the following variation on Perry's puzzle.
Suppose another shopper in the store also comes to
realize at t 2 that I am making a mess. Perhaps Mary points
to me and utters the following sentence:
(4) You are making a mess.
If so, we can use (D3) to analyze her belief.
(4a) There is a relation R, such that
Mary indirectly attributes to B.D. as
the thing to which Mary bears this
relation, the property of making a mess.
Suppose the identifying relation R that Mary bears only to
me is the relation 'standing next to'. In this case Mary
directly attributes to herself the following property:
standing next to exactly one person and to a person making a
mess . As we have already seen, the property that I directly
attribute to myself at t 2 is: being a person who is making a
mess .
From this it might be thought that Chisholm's theory
has the following consequence: Even though Mary refers to
me when she utters 'You are making a mess', and I refer to
myself when I utter 'I am making a mess', we believe
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different things because we directly attribute to ourselves
different properties. The content of our beliefs is not the
same. in general, no one other than myself can believe what
I believe about Beth Dixon when I utter 'I am making a
mess', because, according to (Pi) no one but I can directly
attribute the property making a mess to myself. Other
people can indirectly attribute that property to me, but
indirect attribution will always involve the believer
directly attributing some property that entails an
identifying relation that the believer bears to me. In
other words, a person other than Beth Dixon must always
attribute mess-making to Beth Dixon by means of some
identifying relation. But this is not so in the case where
I directly attribute the property making a mess , since, as
Chisholm puts it:
... in directly attributing a property
to oneself one need not thereby single
out an identifying property of
oneself . 15
Hence, if attributed properties are what is believed, then
no one but I can believe what I believe about myself when
uttering 'I am making a mess'. There is a sense in which
what I believe about myself is inaccessible to others.
Though it is tempting to charge Chisholm with some
version of inaccessibility or privileged access, it is wrong
to do so. This charge depends on two claims:
(a) According to Chisholm, belief content is to be
identified with the property attributed; and
(b) Mary and I directly attribute different
properties to ourselves when I utter 'I am making
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mess', and Mary utters 'You are making a mess'
while pointing to me.
So, the content of my belief is different from the content
of Mary's belief.
The appropriate response to this is to note that there
are different ways to individuate belief content. Though
Mary and I each directly attribute different properties to
ourselves, Mary indirectly attributes to me the very same
property that I directly attribute to myself. Mary
indirectly attributes to me the property making a mess , and
I directly attribute the property making a mess . Same
property--same belief content. The difference in this way
of individuating Mary's belief lies in identifying her
belief content with the property she indirectly attributes
to me. There is no reason to assume that belief content
must always be individuated by the property that is
directly attributed, rather than indirectly attributed. In
fact, Chisholm suggests otherwise in the following passage:
More generally, whenever we have
indirect attribution, then the believer
attributes a property to the object, as
the thing to which he bears a certain
identifying relation. We may call the
property thus attributed the content of
the indirect attribution . . . 16
One advantage of Chisholm's property theory of belief
is that it allows us to avoid the kind of privileged access
associated with two-place propositional theories of belief.
This is accomplished by locating indexicality in the
attitude itself, rather than in a property or a proposition.
On Chisholm's account, the reflexivity of 'she herself'
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appears as a condition of direct attribution—each person
can directly attribute a property only to herself. But, as
we have seen, this will not affect the accessibility of
belief content if beliefs are individuated by the property
that is either directly or indirectly attributed.
There is a more serious difficulty for Chisholm's
property theory. At one point in The First Person
f Chisholm
suggests that one might provide a uniform analysis of
propositional attitudes other than 'believes'. After
introducing the definition of 'x believes that he himself is
F' in terms of direct attribution (Dl)
,
Chisholm goes on to
say:
What we have said about attribution and
believing may be extended to the other
intentional attitudes and, indeed, to
thought itself. Let us consider the
latter briefly.
The expression 'entertaining' is
sometimes taken to refer to the generic
sense of thinking. Entertainment is
then recognized as being an intentional
attitude taking the same objects as
believing, but not involving the
doxastic commitment that is essential to
believing. . .
But if the primary form of
believing is the direct attribution of a
property to oneself, then the primary
form of 'entertainment' is analogous.
It is that phenomenon which is
considering oneself as having a certain
property—or, alternatively put,
thinking of oneself as having a certain
property. If I am trying to make a
decision as to which direction to travel
in, I consider myself as travelling in
one direction and then consider myself
as travelling in another. I will be the
object of such considering and the
property I consider myself as having
will be the content . 1 '
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In this passage Chisholm explains how we are to extend
the kind of analysis provided by direct attribution to the
intentional attitude 'entertain'. But it is not obvious how
to extrapolate from 'belief' and 'entertain', to attitudes
like 'fear', 'wish', or 'hope', to name a few. To
illustrate the difficulty here, I consider a number of ways
to analyze the following locution:
(5) x fears that she herself is F.
First note that any definitional analysis of (5) cannot
contain the attitude 'fear' without such a definition being
circular. This seems fairly obvious, but it is tempting to
suppose that the most straightforward way of handling a
sentence like: 'Tom fears that he himself will fail the
exam' is to say that Tom fears oneself to have a certain
property—namely, failing the exam . When analyzing this
sentence we are prevented from using the attribution
'fearing oneself' or 'oneself fearing' because the attitude
'fear' now appears also in the analysis itself, making the
definition circular. Perhaps what we need in the analysis
of (5) is another attitude that captures the meaning of
'fear' in much the same way that 'consider' captures the
meaning of 'entertain'.
If Tom fears that he himself will fail the exam, then
the property failing the exam is not a property that Tom
wants to attribute to himself. So, perhaps (5) can be
analyzed as:
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(6) x fears that he himself is F =Df.the property of being F is such that’xdoes not want to attribute it to x.
The analysis in (6) may capture Tom's case of fearing since
it makes sense to think that Tom does not want to fail the
exam, but there are other instances of the locution in (5)
that are not explained by the definition given in (6)
.
For example, consider the case where Mary voluntarily
chooses to present her oral report on the second day of
class. On that day Mary fears that she herself is next (to
present her oral report)
. Mary may have a certain amount of
apprehension or dread about being the next person to face
the class, but she still wants to be next. In fact, she
volunteered to speak on this particular day. In this case,
it is true Mary fears that she herself is next, but false
that the property of being next is such that Mary does not
want to attribute it to herself.
If we try to provide an analysis of (5) that
accommodates the case involving Mary, there are other
instances of (5) that will be counter-examples to this
revised definition. For example, when Mary fears that she
herself is next, the context of the example suggests that
she is apprehensive. This is the sense of 'fear' that comes
closest to capturing her attitude. We might try the
following alternative definition of (5)
:
(7) x fears that she herself is F =Df.
the property of being F is such that x
is apprehensive of attributing it to x.
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The analysis in (7) is awkward sounding, even for the
case it is designed to explain. We ordinarily think that
Mary is apprehensive of the state of affairs of being next,
and not apprehensive of attributing to herself the property
of being next. Putting this aside, the main problem with
(7) is that there are instances of the locution in (5) that
clearly cannot be analyzed in terms of the attitude
'apprehension 1
. For example, suppose Todd is held hostage
by homicidal terrorists who have been systematically killing
off each member of the hostage group. Todd fears that he
himself will die, but it would be inaccurate to say that
Todd is merely apprehensive of attributing the property of
dying to himself. Todd is terrified of dying, and to
explain his attitude of fear any less strongly would be to
misrepresent his state of mind in this context.
'Apprehension' is surely not strong enough to serve as a
definitional analysis of this particular instance of (5)
.
In general, I suggest that there will be no analysis of
'x fears that she herself is F' that will capture the
meaning of all instances of this locution. Even if we could
settle on another attitude that covered the majority of ways
in which we ordinarily use this locution, I maintain there
is no guarantee that further analyses can be found for other
attitudes such as 'desiring', 'hoping' 'loathing', etc.
Thus, it is difficult to see how Chisholm's analysis of
'entertaining' can be easily extended to other intentional
attitudes
.
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Perhaps what is required is an analysis that is more
like Chisholm's treatment of 'x believes that he himself is
F'. In definition D. 1 , 'direct attribution' is introduced
as an undefined primitive that functions as the analysis of
^ believes that he himself is x' . Why not introduce
another such primitive to analyze the locution in (5)? Our
analysis might look as follows:
(8) x fears that she herself is F =Df.
the property of being F is such that x
f-attributes it to x.
The following are conditions governing the use of ' f-
attributes', analogous to Chisholm's (PI) and (P2) .
(PI*) For every x, every y and every z,
if x f-attributes x to y, then x is
identical with y.
( P2 * ) For every x, every y and every z,
if x f-attributes z to y, then z is a
property
.
In principle there is nothing objectionable about
introducing the undefined primitive 'f-attributes' to
analyze the locution in (5)
.
But if this strategy were
generalized we would have to introduce a new primitive term
in the analysis of every intentional attitude. I suspect
this is not what Chisholm had in mind when he claimed, "What
we have said about attribution and believing may be extended
to the other intentional
attitudes. . .
"
18
The main objection to such a strategy is that we have
said nothing about the analysis in (8) that explains how it
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About 'directis different from 'directly attribute',
attribution' Chisholm says:
We presuppose two things about the
abilities or faculties of believers.
First, a believer can take himself as
his intentional object; that is to say,
he can direct his thoughts upon himself.
And, secondly, in so doing, grasps or
conceives a certain property which he
attributes to himself. 1^
If the analysis of 'x fears that she herself is F' is not
identical to the analysis of 'x believes that she herself is
F', then we should be able to explain how ' f-attributes
' is
different from the above account Chisholm provides of
'direct attribution'. Since our earlier attempts to analyze
'x fears that she herself is F' by means of some other
attitude were unsuccessful, it is not clear what more can be
said to explicate this locution. In summary, although
Chisholm indicates that there is a straightforward way of
extending his property theory analysis to propositional
attitudes other than 'believes', it is not obvious how to do
so. This is a disadvantage of Chisholm's theory.
Lewis and Self-Ascription
Both Chisholm and Lewis analyze simple subject-
predicate sentences containing 'believes' as two-place
relations between an individual and a property that is
attributed to oneself via a special relation. Where
Chisholm calls this relation 'direct attribution', Lewis
refers to properties that are 'self-ascribed'.
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Lewis's strategy in "Attitudes De Dicto and De Se'' 20 is
to argue that: (l) self-ascribed properties will serve as
the objects of belief as well as propositions, where
propostions are construed as sets of possible worlds, and
(2) in some cases properties will do as the objects of
belief but propositions will not. By 'property' Lewis means
"the set of exactly those possible beings, actual or not,
that have the property in question." 21 Lewis defends his
first claim by pointing out a one-to-one correspondence
between all propositions and some properties. For any set
of worlds there will correspond to this set the property of
inhabiting some world in that set. So, whenever it is
appropriate to designate a proposition as the object of an
attitude, we can just as easily assign the corresponding
property instead.
Lewis defends the second, and more controversial of his
two claims, by considering examples involving indexical
belief. These examples suggest that belief cannot be
analyzed as a relation between a believer and a proposition.
Specifically, Lewis considers Perry's example of an
amensiac, Rudolph Lingens, who is lost in the Stanford
Library. No matter how many books he reads describing his
own life history and many detailed accounts of the Stanford
Library, he still will not find his way out until he is
ready to say, "This place is aisle five, floor six, of Main
Library, Stanford; and I am Rudolph Lingens." Lewis says
about Lingens:
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Book learning will help Lingens locate
himself in logical space
. . . the more
he reads, the more propositions he
believes, and the more he is in a
position to self-ascribe properties of
inhabiting such-and-such a kind of
world. But none of this, by itself, can
guarantee that he knows where in the
world he is. He needs to locate himself
not only in logical space but also in
ordinary space. He needs to self-
ascribe the property of being in aisle
five, floor six, of Main Library,
Stanford; and this is not one of the
properties that corresponds to a
proposition . 22
On the basis of this example and others, Lewis argues
that some beliefs cannot be understood as propositional, but
can be understood as the self-ascription of properties. He
further proposes that all belief be analyzed as the self-
ascription of properties. However, in those cases where no
indexical belief is involved, the self-ascription of a
property entails just that the believer inhabit a world
where she has that property.
Like Chisholm's theory, the analysis of 'believes'
Lewis offers is motivated by the problems peculiar to
indexical belief. So, it is not surprising that Lewis's
account can be used to explain Perry's puzzle of the messy
shopper.
At I believe that the shopper with the torn sack is
making a mess. According to Lewis, my belief involves the
self-ascription of the property; inhabiting a world where
the shopper with the torn sack is making a mess . At t 2 ,
when I learn that I am making a mess, I merely self-ascribe
the property: making a mess . On this account, the property
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I self-ascribe at t 2 is different from the property I self-
ascribe at t^, since there are worlds where I exist but I am
not the shopper with the torn sack. Lewis would describe
the belief I form at t 2 as. a case where a proposition will
not do as the object of my belief but a self-ascribed
property will.
Because I self-ascribe a different property at t 2 , we
seem able to explain my change in belief, and also, to
explain why I stopped to straighten my cart at the later
time. I self-ascribe a different property at t 2 than I
self-ascribe at t]_. Therefore, my believe at t 2 is
different from my belief at t]_.
Individuating Beliefs
In this section I argue that Lewis's theory of belief
does not entail privileged access for the agents of
indexical sentences, though it is tempting to charge Lewis
with some version of inaccessibility. Consider the
following analysis Lewis offers of 'belief de re' :
(DR) A subject ascribes property X to
individual Y if and only if the subject
ascribes X to Y under some description Z
such that either (1) Z captures the
essence of Y, or (2) Z is a relation of
acquaintance that the subject bears to
Y.Z3
Lewis finds that essences are hard to come by. If we
thought essences were the only suitable descriptions under
which we had de re beliefs, we would likely not have de re
beliefs at all, for the essence of a thing is an extremely
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rich property that will single out an individual from all
inhabitants of this world, and from all that individual's
"not-quite-counter-parts" at every other possible world. In
general, Lewis argues that we don't form beliefs de re about
individuals in virtue of knowing their essences.
Alternatively, Lewis proposes that we form de re
beliefs about individuals when we bear to them a "relation
of acquaintance." This is the case when:
. . . I and the one of whom I have
beliefs de re are so related that there
is an extensive causal dependence of my
states upon his; and this causal
dependence is of a sort apt for the
reliable transmission of information . 24
The examples Lewis uses to illustrate belief de re indicate
that at least some ordinary definite descriptions are
sufficient for establishing a relation of acquaintance. For
example, one can be 'acquainted' with Hume by ascribing
nobility to Hume under the description 'the one I have heard
of under the name of 'Hume''. Moreover, we sometimes form
de re beliefs about ourselves that involve a relation of
acquaintance. Lewis says:
. . .
watching is a relation of
acquaintance. I watch myself in
reflecting glass, unaware that I am
watching myself. I ascribe to myself
under the description "the one I am
watching," the property of wearing pants
that are on fire. I therefore believe
de re of the one I am watching—that is,
myself—that his pants are on fire. But
I do not self-ascribe the property of
wearing pants that are on fire. . . . so
self-ascription isn't quite the same
thing as ascription, de re to oneself.
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The suitable description
•
Z
• that occurs in Lewis's
(DR) is analogous to Chisholm's identifying relation 'R'
that occurs in (D2) and (D3)
. Both Chisholm and Lewis
analyze third person attributions of belief by means of a
relation, specifiable by a description.
We might interpret Lewis's property theory to entail
inaccessible beliefs in the following way. Suppose that
these two sentences are true:
(9) You are making a mess (uttered by Mary,
while pointing to Beth Dixon)
.
(10) I am making a mess (uttered by Beth
Dixon)
.
If beliefs are individuated by the properties Mary and I
self-ascribe, then we believe different things. Mary
ascribes to me the property making a mess if and only if she
ascribes this property to me under some description ' Z ' that
either captures my essence or is a relation of acquaintance
that Mary bears to me. The latter condition is satisfied
if, for example, Mary ascribes making a mess to me under the
description 'the only shopper in aisle five'. The full
analysis of Mary's belief in (9) will involve that she self-
ascribe the property: inhabiting a world where the only
shopper in aisle five is making a mess . As we have noted,
(10) will be analyzed as Beth Dixon's self-ascription of the
property: making a mess . Since Mary and I self-ascribe
different properties, we believe different things.
On the basis of Lewis's principle (DR) we can infer
that beliefs about individuals other than oneself will
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always involve the self-ascription of a descriptive relation
that the believer bears to the object of her belief. No one
can believe what I believe about myself when I believe that
I am making a mess because, in self-ascribing making a
I do not specify any descriptive relation that I bear to
myself. if beliefs are individuated by properties that are
self-ascribed, then there is a sense in which my belief
about myself is inaccessible to all others.
The easiest way to avoid this kind of inaccessibility
is to argue that not all beliefs must be individuated by the
property that is self—ascribed. Just as Chisholm might say
that Mary indirectly attributes the same property to me that
I directly attribute to myself; Lewis can claim that Mary
ascribes the property making a mess to me under some
description ' Z
'
,
while I self-ascribe the property making a
mess. Since we ascribe the same property to the same
object, we believe the same thing. In this way privileged
access is easily avoided on Lewis's theory.
Beliefs are in the Head
If there is a disadvantage to Lewis's theory, it is
that individuating beliefs by properties is not sufficiently
complex enough to represent our various ways of making
belief attributions. In the following passage Lewis
considers Perry's example of mad Heimson, who, believing
himself to be Hume, self-ascribes the same property that
Hume self-ascribes
—
being identical to Hume .
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There are two ways out. (l) Heimsondoes not, after all, believe what Humedid, or (2) Heimson does believe what
Hume did, but Heimson believes falsely
what Hume believed truly.
.
If we can agree that beliefs are in
the head, so that Heimson and Hume mayindeed believe alike, then the first way
out is shut. We must take the second.
Heimson | s belief and Hume's have the
same object, but Heimson is wrong and
Hume is right
. . . the object of their
shared belief
. . . is a property: the
property of being Hume. Hume self-
ascribes this property; he has it; he is
right. Heimson, believing just what
Hume does, self-ascribes the very same
property; he lacks it; he is wrong. 26
From this passage we see Lewis is committed to
individuating beliefs by properties, or what he refers to as
'the objects' of belief. For Lewis, Heimson and Hume have
the same belief even though it is false that Heimson has the
property being identical to Hume . But the fact that we can
assign different truth-values to what Heimson and Hume
believe suggests there is a difference in their beliefs.
Moreover, we also want to say that two individuals believe
differently in the case where they both truthfully self-
ascribe the same property. Nevertheless, Lewis appears to
have his own reasons for individuating beliefs by
properties. About the case of mad Heimson who believes
himself to be Hume, Lewis says:
Heimson may have got his head into
perfect match with Hume's in every way
that is at all relevant to what he
believes. If nevertheless Heimson and
Hume do not believe alike, then beliefs
ain't in the head ! They depend partly
on something else, so that if your head
is in a certain state and you're Hume
you believe one thing, but if your head
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is in that same state and you're Heimsonyou believe something else. Not good.The main purpose of assigning objects of
attitudes is, I take it, to characterize
states of the head: to specify their
causal role with respect to behavior,
stimuli, and one another. if the
assignment of objects depends partly on
something besides the state of the head,
it will not serve this purpose. The
states it characterizes will not be the
occupants of the causal roles
.
27
What Lewis says appears to be a positive proposal for
individuating the objects of belief by the self
—ascribed
properties. But since Lewis offers no explanation for
beliefs being 'in the head', it is difficult to evaluate
this proposal . 28 The complaint seems to be that if beliefs
are not in the head they will fail to serve as the occupants
of causal roles in explanations of behavior. I presume
Lewis means that we want to be able to say, when Mary and I
both self-ascribe the property making a mess , we believe the
same thing. And, our beliefs play the same causal role with
respect to our behavior. Specifically, the object of belief
should figure in our subsequent, cart-straightening
behavior.
This much of Lewis's claim is uncontroversial . Any
plausible theory of belief should explain how beliefs
contribute to explanations of behavior. But requiring
beliefs to play a causal role is not a convincing reason for
individuating beliefs by properties alone. This prevents us
from saying that there is a sense in which Mary and I
believe differently when we each self-ascribe making a mess .
Giving up this way of individuating indexical belief is
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unnecessary when there are alternative analyses that seem
designed to accommodate this way of individuating indexical
belief. Consider the following example discussed by David
Kaplan:
We raise two identical twins, Castor and
Pollux, under qualitatively identical
conditions, qualitatively identical
stimuli, etc. If necessary, we may
monitor their brain states and make
small corrections in their brain
structures if they begin drifting
apart. They respond to all cognitive
stimuli in identical fashion. Have we
not been successful in achieving the
same cognitive state? Of course we
have, what more could one ask! But
wait, they believe different things.
Each sincerely says, "My brother was
born before I was" and the beliefs they
thereby express conflict. In this,
Castor speaks the truth, while Pollux
speaks falsely. This does not reflect
on the identity of their cognitive
states, for, as Putnam has emphasized,
circumstances alone do not determine
extension (here, the truth value) from
cognitive state. Insofar as distinct
persons can be in the same cognitive
state, Castor and Pollux are . 39
Kaplan invokes the notions of character and content to
explain the cognitive states and belief content of Castor
and Pollux. I believe Kaplan is right to try to accommodate
two ways of individuating indexical belief:
As
In discussing the twins, I tried to show
that persons could be in the same total
cognitive state and still, as we would
say, believe different things . 30
a theory of belief
,
Lewis's property theory is not
complex enough to allow us to say that Castor and Pollux are
in the same cognitive (belief) state and that they believe
different things. I think this is a disadvantage of Lewis's
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theory, especially when there may be viable alternatives to
analyzing self-attribution that permit us to individuate
indexical belief in a more intuitively plausible way.
Perry's distinction between propositional content and belief
states, or Kaplan's distinction between character and
content are more suitable for explaining attributions of
indexical belief.
To summarize, it appears that the property theories of
belief proposed by Chisholm and Lewis do not commit us to
privileged access of the sort entailed by the two-place
propositional theory. Nevertheless, I am still reluctant to
endorse these property theories for the following reasons.
Chisholm suggests that his analysis of de se belief in terms
of direct attribution can be extended to propositional
attitudes other than 'believes', but it is difficult to see
how this project is to be carried out. Lewis suggests that
individuating beliefs by properties is consistent with the
requirement that beliefs be in the head. But Lewis is not
specific about the proposal he is recommending for the
narrow individuation of belief content. Furthermore,
individuating belief content by properties alone does not
allow us to say that there is a sense in which Mary and I
believe differently when we both self-ascribe the property
making a mess . This is not a serious charge against Lewis's
proposal, but it indicates that individuating beliefs by
properties is not sufficient for representing our ordinary
ways of attributing and reporting indexical beliefs.
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION
In this dissertation I have investigated the nature of
privileged access how it arises, why it is objectionable,
and ways to avoid it. I review the results of this
investigation below.
In Chapter One I discuss what is common to the
analyses of indexical belief that follow in later chapters.
All of the analyses I present in the dissertation, with the
possible exception of Chisholm in Person and Object
,
endorse
what I have called the ' Irreplacability Thesis'. This
thesis restricts the co-referential substitution of 'I' or
'she herself' when these first-person reflexive pronouns are
embedded behind propositional attitude verbs like 'believes'
or ' knows '
.
In Chapter Two, I present an argument for the existence
of first-person propositions. The Basic Argument entails
that the agents of first-person indexical sentences have
privileged access to the first-person propositions expressed
by these sentences.
As I show in Chapters Three, Four, and Five, the Basic
Argument is essentially unaffected by characterizing the
objects of belief and knowledge as first-person
propositional guises, propositions that entail individual
essences, or Fregean ' I ' -thoughts . We are still left with
an analysis of self-attribution that entails privileged
access for the agents of first-person indexical sentences.
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The common thread running through each of these proposals is
the assumption that belief is a two-place relation.
In Chapter Six I consider an alternative to two-place
relations of belief. Perry proposes we analyze indexical
belief as a three-place relation between an individual, a
belief state, and a proposition. in this way Perry is able
to avoid privileged access. But Perry's proposal is not
entirely satisfactory because he fails to formulate an
adequate individuation principle for belief states.
In Chapter Seven I present the Chisholm and Lewis
proposal that first-person indexical belief be analyzed as a
two-place relation between a believer and a property. On a
superficial reading of these theories, we might think they
entail a version of privileged access. I argue that the
analysis of indexical belief by properties that are directly
attributed or self-ascribed does not entail privileged
access, though for other reasons I am reluctant to fully
endorse these theories.
By examining each of these ways of analyzing self-
attribution, a pattern begins to emerge. What is revealed
is that inaccessibility, in one form or another, follows
from all the two-place propositional theories of belief I
have considered. I speculate below about why privileged
access arises for these particular theories.
I maintain that privileged access is created by
conflating two different ways of individuating indexical
belief. Indexical belief is ambiguous between what I call
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the 'psychological role' and the
' referential/semantic role'
of belief. Intuitively, we recognize there are two
different ways of individuating the beliefs of individuals
who report their beliefs by a first-person indexical
sentence. For example, when Mary and I both report 'I am
rich' and believe what we say, then in one sense, Mary and I
believe the same thing. Individuating beliefs in this way
allows us to explain and predict why Mary and I exhibit the
same kind of behavior (eating at expensive resturants, etc.)
in virtue of sharing the same belief. This sense of belief
is the psychological role of belief.
In another sense, Mary and I believe differently when
we both utter 'I am rich', because 'I' in the context where
I utter this sentence refers to me, and 'I' in the context
where Mary is the speaker refers to Mary. Because our
beliefs are about different people, we believe different
things. Indexical beliefs individuated in this way have a
referential or semantic role. Belief has a semantic aspect
because we can make reference to the truth-conditions of
utterances to individuate indexical beliefs. What I say
(and believe) is true, while it is possible that what Mary
says (and believes) is false. So, what we say (and believe)
are different.
Combining both ways of individuating indexical belief
creates privileged access. We can see this by a simple
example. Individuating indexical belief by its
psychological role has the result that I do not believe the
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same thing when I utter 'I am rich' and 'She is rich' (while
pointing to my own mirror reflection)
. As the reasoning
goes, I may not recognize myself in the mirror, so I may
believe what I express by ' I am rich' but fail to believe
what I express by 'She is rich' (while pointing to my own
reflection). Moreover, when I utter, 'I am rich' and Mary
utters 'She is rich' while pointing to me, we do not believe
the same thing. Even though we have formed beliefs about
one and the same person, these beliefs play different roles
in explaining our behavior. My belief causes me to eat at
expensive restaurants, while Mary's belief causes her to
turn green with envy. In this sense we believe differently.
If we also individuate beliefs by what I am calling its
referential role, then if Mary and I both utter 'I am rich',
Mary and I have different beliefs because 'I' refers to
different people in the context of our utterances. The
combined result of using both the psychological and
referential roles to individuate belief is that no one but I
can believe what I express by 'I am rich', because no one
but I can use 'I' to report what I believe. I have
privileged access to my indexical belief because we have
individuated this belief according to both the referential
and psychological roles.
Ordinarily, we do not use both roles together to
individuate indexical belief. We normally say that if Mary
and I both utter 'I am rich', in one sense Mary and I
believe the same thing, and in another sense Mary and I
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believe differently. But when self-attribution is analyzed
as a two-place relation between an individual and a
proposition, these two ways of individuating belief content
are conflated in the second term of the relation—the
proposition. Propositions are sometimes construed as the
semantic objects assigned to an utterance of an indexical
sentence. So, the proposition expressed by an indexical
sentence in a context is the bearer of truth and falsity,
individuated by its semantic content according to the
referent of 'I' in a particular context. In addition,
though, the proposition expressed by an utterance of an
indexical sentence is also the object of belief for the
speaker. As such, the proposition is also required to play
a causal role in explanations of behavior. If propositions
are what is believed, we will want to individuate them
according to the psychological role of belief.
Because propositions have both a semantic role and a
psychological role as the objects of belief, they are
individuated according to both of these senses of belief I
have identified. When we try to individuate propositions
according to both roles, the result is first-person
propositions and privileged access for the agents of
indexical sentences. Privileged access is entailed by two-
place relations of belief because the psychological object
of belief must be one and the same as the semantic object
expressed by the embedded indexical sentence. Because this
is so we cannot expect to avoid inaccessibility by
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introducing propositional guises, individual essences, or
Fregean
'
I '
-thoughts as the objects of belief. My
examination of these various proposals supports this
conclusion.
What is wrong with this kind of privileged access? My
complaints about first-person propositions are that they
undermine the traditional conception of a proposition as a
publicly accessible entity. Without this traditional way of
characterizing propositions it is difficult to explain how
propositions can be the bearers of truth and falsity, and
how communication between language users takes place.
Furthermore, inaccessible beliefs interfere with our
ordinary way of ascribing beliefs. We use belief content in
a variety of ways to communicate about psychological states,
to report about our own beliefs and the beliefs of others,
and to explain behavior by appealing to what is believed.
Ordinarily, we want to be able to say that when I believe
that I am rich, and Mary believes that I am rich, we have
the same belief. And further, to use the common content of
our beliefs to explain reasons for acting in a psychology
of human behavior. Beliefs that are inaccessible interfere
with our "folk psychology " 1 about human action and
behavior. In short, privileged acess threatens our common
sense conception of belief, and the conception of a
proposition firmly embedded in the philosophical literature.
By this I have not shown that any analysis of belief that
entails inaccessiblity is false. It is always possible to
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argue that we should, instead, relinquish a particular
conception of propositions as well as our ordinary ways of
talking about indexical belief. But I think this is a
drastic step, and unnecessary. As we have already seen in
Chapters Six and Seven, there are other theories of belief
that avoid privileged access.
If I am right about why inaccessibility arises for two-
place propositional theories of belief, then three-place
relations of belief, such as the analysis Perry offers,
appear the most promising way to avoid this consequence. A
three-place relation allows us to treat indexical belief as
genuinely ambiguous in its analysis. We can use one term in
the relation to individuate beliefs by their psychological
role, and the other term to individuate beliefs by their
referential role. Though Perry's analysis suffers from lack
of a plausible individuation principle for belief states,
his three-place relation is the right way to avoid
collapsing these two different senses of belief. Perry
uses belief states to individuate beliefs by their
psychological role, and the singular proposition expressed
by an indexical sentence to individuate beliefs by their
referential or semantic role.
Though other philosophers may be less concerned than I
with privileged access and the problems that follow from it,
there is some agreement that the analysis of indexical
belief should accommodate both of what I have been calling
its psychological and referential roles. In Knowing Who ,^
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• #
Boer and Lycan distinguish two schemes for interpretating
se ^
f
-attributed belief and knowledge: a functional or
computational scheme (the causal role of belief and
knowledge), and a referential or truth-conditional scheme.
Following Boer and Lycan in their representation of these
two different schemes, Jay Garfield distinguishes the
semantics of self-attributed beliefs from the psychological
states that are causally efficacious in bringing about
behavior . 3 And, Colin McGinn has argued for a "dual
aspect" theory of belief content, in which he identifies two
separable components—the causal-explanatory role of belief,
and beliefs as "items possessed of referential truth-
conditions . " 4
These proposals may be problematic for reasons that
have nothing to do with privileged access. A close
examination will have to be postponed. But now, at least,
knowing more about what privileged access is, the problems
it creates, and how it arises, I am optimistic we can
formulate a theory of self-attribution that is more
plausible than any I have considered here.
167
Notes
1.
This expression has been used by a number of contemporary
philosophers writing in the philosophy of mind. For
example, Stephen Stich says, "In our everyday dealings with
one another we invoke a variety of commonsense psychological
terms including 'believe', 'remember', 'feel', 'think',
'desire', 'prefer', 'imagine', 'fear', and many others. The
use of these terms is governed by a loose knit network of
largely tacit principles, platitudes, and paradigms which
constitute a sort of folk theory." Following recent
practice, I will call this network folk psychology .
2.
Steven Boer and W.G. Lycan, Knowing Who
.
MIT Press,
1986.
3.
Jay Garfield, Belief in Psychology: A Study in the
Ontology of Mind . MIT Press, 1988.
4.
Colin McGinn, "The Structure of Content," in Thought and
Object: Essays on Intentionalitv . ed. by Andrew Woodfield,
Clarendon Press, 1982, pages 207-258.
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